We examine whether and, if so, how retail consumers change their shopping in response to firm‐specific negative environmental, social, and governance (ESG) news. Using an event study methodology, we do not find significant changes in consumer foot traffic in response to negative ESG news, on average. However, the average consumer reacts negatively when such news is covered by national or global media outlets, which elevates consumer awareness. In addition, we provide evidence of the heterogeneity in responses to negative ESG news across consumer groups. Consumers in more ESG‐conscious counties, as measured by county ESG preferences, income, education, and political ideology, reduce store visits in response to negative ESG news. In contrast, consumers in the least ESG‐conscious counties increase their visits in response to negative ESG news. These opposing reactions explain the insignificant average consumer response to negative ESG news. Furthermore, the ESG‐conscious consumers' negative reaction is, at most, modest, dissipating within six weeks. Overall, our findings suggest that firms face divergent responses to ESG activities from different consumer groups, underscoring the divisive nature of ESG issues.

A recent trend is that firms prefer to hire generalist CEOs with transferable skills (across firms or industries) over hiring specialist CEOs, but the consequences of this trend are unclear. In this study, we examine whether credit rating agencies consider a CEO's general skills as a credit risk factor when assessing an entity's overall creditworthiness. We predict and find that generalist CEOs are associated with lower credit ratings, suggesting that the presence of generalist CEOs is a significant credit rating factor. We also find that generalist CEOs are likely to take on more risks, which leads to more volatile performance ex post, and our path analyses confirm default risk is a significant mediator between credit ratings and CEOs' general skills. Our results hold in the presence of additional controls (e.g., CEO characteristics and corporate governance), when applying different fixed‐effect models and different matching methods, and for a subsample with forced CEO turnover. We also find that the negative relationship is attenuated for R&D‐intensive firms and firms in competitive industries. Last, we provide evidence that firms with generalist CEOs face higher borrowing costs, such as bond yields and syndicated loan spreads. Overall, our results contribute to a growing literature on the costs and benefits of hiring generalist CEOs, by providing a full picture of why hiring a generalist CEO may benefit shareholders but also cause misalignments with bondholders' interests.