Much of the empirical literature that has examined the functional relationship between firm value and managerial ownership levels assumes that managerial ownership levels are exogenous and are the only component of managerial compensation related to firm performance. This assumption is contrary to the theoretical and empirical literature wherein managerial compensation is endogenously determined and includes both shares and options. Using instruments for managerial compensation and panel data to control for unobservable heterogeneity in the firm’s contracting environment, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations. We find that firms are in equilibrium when they endogenously set their chief executive officer’s compensation.

This paper examines the impact of the borrower–lender relationship on the explicit loan interest rate and collateral, as well as the correlation between loan interest rates and collateral. Using a simultaneous equation approach, we find that collateral has a statistically significant positive impact of 200 to 400 basis points on loan interest rates. We find this positive association to be stronger for personal (or outside) collateral than collateral provided by the firm's assets (or inside collateral). Finally, we find the economic impact of the borrower–lender relationship to be 21 basis points for one standard deviation increase in relationship length.

The role of productivity in firm performance is of fundamental importance to the US economy. Consistent with the corporate finance approach, this paper uses the ownership stake of a firm's managers as an argument in estimating the firm's production function. Accordingly, this paper brings together the corporate finance and productivity literature. Using a large sample of randomly selected manufacturing firms that does not suffer from any survivorship or large firm size biases, we find that managerial ownership changes are positively related to changes in productivity. We also find a higher sensitivity of changes in managerial ownership to changes in productivity for firms who experience greater than the median change in managerial ownership. These results are robust to including lagged estimates of production inputs, year dummies and separate dummies for each firm to control for unobservable firm characteristics. In addition, we find that the stock market rewards firms with increases in firm value when these firms increase their level of productivity.

The extant literature suggests that one of the main causes of the recent financial crisis was the excessive use of short-term debt by banks. Using a large sample of banks, we find that increases in repurchase agreements (repos) were recognized by external capital markets to increase bank risk in the pre-crisis period. In the crisis, we find a negative relationship between repos and risk. We attribute this result to evidence suggesting that “good” banks were able to continue funding their repos, whereas “bad” banks had to significantly decrease their repo funding.

Both managerial ownership and performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only partly observed) changes in the firm's contracting environment. We extend the cross-sectional results of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), (Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155–1177) and use panel data to show that managerial ownership is explained by key variables in the contracting environment in ways consistent with the predictions of principal-agent models. A large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity. Moreover, after controlling both for observed firm characteristics and firm fixed effects, we cannot conclude (econometrically) that changes in managerial ownership affect firm performance.

This paper examines whether shareholder value-maximizing corporate governance mechanisms assist in reducing the managerial incentive to enter value-destroying bank acquisitions. We find that diversifying bank acquisitions earn significantly negative announcement period abnormal returns (AR) for bidder banks whereas focusing acquisitions earn zero AR. We then find that corporate governance variables (such as CEO share and option ownership and a smaller board size) in the bidding bank are less effective in diversifying acquisitions than in focusing acquisitions. These results are robust to the inclusion of the usual control variables.

This paper examines the effect of commercial bank entry on underwriting spreads for IPOs, SEOs, and debt issues using a long time series that spans 30 years, from 1975 to 2004. We find that, on average, commercial banks charge lower spreads of approximately 72 basis points for IPOs, 43 basis points for SEOs, and 14 basis points for debt over the entire sample period. The economic impact of commercial banks on lowering underwriting spreads is most significant when commercial banks were allowed to enter via Section 20 subsidiaries but persists beyond. Commercial bank entry into underwriting appears to have a procompetitive effect that lasts many years after their initial entry.

The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that CEO might not make risky long-term investments if the CEO believes that the benefit of such investments would not materialize or is not recognized by the market until after the CEO has retired. This paper tests the predictions of the Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011) internal governance model to counteract the CEO’s tendency to forego such investments on a sample of voluntary CEO turnovers. We find that the optimal level of sharing of tasks between the CEO and her top-management team, the firm’s internal governance, is dependent on the CEO’s career horizon. Additionally, we find the effect of internal governance only matters for older CEOs. We also find that the closer the internal governance is to the optimal level, the smaller is the underinvestment for an older outgoing CEO. We find that the new incoming CEO divests profitably the assets acquired under good internal governance. Finally, we find that optimal internal governance is found to have positive effects on corporate innovation. Our results are robust to continuous matching by generalized propensity score and controlling for the CEO’s explicit pay-performance sensitivity, succession plan, and pay duration.

We analyze the impact of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) on corporate bond ratings issued by credit rating agencies (CRAs). We find no evidence that Dodd-Frank disciplines CRAs to provide more accurate and informative credit ratings. Instead, following Dodd-Frank, CRAs issue lower ratings, give more false warnings, and issue downgrades that are less informative. These results are consistent with the reputation model of Morris (2001), and suggest that CRAs become more protective of their reputation following the passage of Dodd-Frank. Consistent with Morris (2001), we find that our results are stronger for industries with low Fitch market share, where Moody׳s and Standard & Poor׳s have stronger incentives to protect their reputation (Becker and Milbourn, 2011). Our results are not driven by business cycle effects or firm characteristics, and strengthen as the uncertainty regarding the passage of Dodd-Frank gets resolved. We conclude that increasing the legal and regulatory costs to CRAs might have an adverse effect on the quality of credit ratings.

We use a movie industry project-by-project dataset to analyze the choice of financing a project internally versus financing it through outside alliances. The results indicate that project risk is positively correlated with alliance formation. Movie studios produce a variety of films and tend to develop their safest projects internally. Our findings are consistent with internal capital market explanations. We find mixed evidence regarding resource pooling, i.e., sharing the cost of large projects. Finally, the evidence shows that projects developed internally perform similarly to projects developed through outside alliances.