This paper describes a simple model of labor disputes based on the hypothesis that unions use strikes to infer the profitability of the firm. The model posits the existence of a negatively sloped resistance curve between wages and strike duration. In addition, it offer a series of predictions relating wage and strike outcomes to changes in the expected profitability of the firm and changes in the alternative opportunities of striking workers. These implications are tested using data on wage outcomes, strike probabilities, and strike durations for a large sample of collective bargaining agreements.

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This paper studies the effects of unions on the structure of wages using an estimation technique that accounts for misclassification errors in reported union status and potential correlations between union status and unobserved productivity. The model is estimated separately for five skill groups using a panel data set formed from the U.S. Current Population Survey. The results suggest that unions raise wages more for workers with lower levels of observed skills. Union workers are positively selected from the population of workers with lower levels of observed skill and negatively selected from the population with higher observed skills. Copyright 1996 by The Econometric Society.

How has publishing in top economics journals changed since 1970? Using a data set that combines information on all articles published in the top-five journals from 1970 to 2012 with their Google Scholar citations, we identify nine key trends. First, annual submissions to the top-five journals nearly doubled from 1990 to 2012. Second, the total number of articles published in these journals actually declined from 400 per year in the late 1970s to 300 per year most recently. As a result, the acceptance rate has fallen from 15 percent to 6 percent, with potential implications for the career progression of young scholars. Third, one journal, the American Economic Review, now accounts for 40 percent of top-five publications, up from 25 percent in the 1970s. Fourth, recently published papers are on average three times longer than they were in the 1970s, contributing to the relative shortage of journal space. Fifth, the number of authors per paper has increased from 1.3 in 1970 to 2.3 in 2012, partly offsetting the fall in the number of articles per year. Sixth, citations for top-five publications are high: among papers published in the late 1990s, the median number of Google Scholar citations is 200. Seventh, the ranking of journals by citations has remained relatively stable, with the notable exception of the Quarterly Journal of Economics, which climbed from fourth place to first place over the past three decades. Eighth, citation counts are significantly higher for longer papers and those written by more coauthors. Ninth, although the fraction of articles from different fields published in the top five has remained relatively stable, there are important cohort trends in the citations received by papers from different fields, with rising citations to more recent papers in Development and International, and declining citations to recent papers in Econometrics and Theory. (JEL A14)

The recent rise in wage inequality is usually attributed to skill-biased technical change (SBTC), associated with new computer technologies. We review the evidence for this hypothesis, focusing on the implications of SBTC for overall wage inequality and for changes in wage differentials between groups. A key problem for the SBTC hypothesis is that wage inequality stabilized in the 1990s despite continuing advances in computer technology; SBTC also fails to explain the evolution of other dimensions of wage inequality, including the gender and racial wage gaps and the age gradient in the return to education.

Strike outcomes in the 1880s had a "winner-take-all" character. Successful strikes ended with a discrete wage gain; failed strikes ended with a return to work at the prestrike wage. We present a theoretical interpretation of these outcomes based on a war-of-attrition model. We fit an empirical model specifying the capitulation times of the two parties and the size of the wage gain in the event of a strike success. The results show a systematic relation between the determinants of strike success and the determinants of the wage gain for a successful strike.

I briefly review the emergence of “ design-based” research methods in labor economics in the 1980s and early 1990s. These methods were seen as a partial solution to the problems of credible inference identified by Ashenfelter (1974), Leamer (1978), Hendry (1980), and others. Designed-based studies typically use a simplified one-equation model of the outcome of interest—in contrast to model-based studies that specify a data generating process for all factors determining the outcome. I discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of the design-based approach and the value of such research in the field. (JEL C20, J01, J24, J31, J38, J51, J53)

I discuss the recent literature that has led to new interest in the idea of monopsonistic wage setting. Building on advances in search theory and in models of differentiated products, researchers have used a number of different strategies to identify the elasticity of firm-specific labor supply. A growing consensus is that firms have some wage-setting power, though many questions remain about the sources of that power. (JEL B21, D21, D24, D43, J22, J31, J42)