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Introduction: A Good Start? Determinants of Initial Labor Market Success

Journal of Labor Economics 2019 37(S1), S1-S9
Some of the most important but difficult issues in modern societies revolve around a simple question: What factors ensure that a young person will have a good start when she or he first enters the labor market? The importance of this question has been driven home by three sets of research findings. First, there is substantial persistence in labor market outcomes over the life cycle. Good or bad outcomes early in a career are strong indicators of long-term success or failure. Second, although immutable factors like parents’ education exert a powerful and lasting influence on children’s outcomes, there is an important causal role for potentially malleable factors like schools, neighborhoods, and local institutions. Third, some groups of youth—particularly those from disadvantaged family backgrounds—appear to be especially vulnerable to both temporary shocks and permanent features of the environment in which they were raised. Traditionally, economists have thought of employment as a key metric for assessing the initial success of young people. By this standard, youth are much worse off today than in earlier decades. As shown in figure 1, the average fraction of 16–24-year-olds working in any week fell from around 60% in the late 1970s to around 50% today. The decline for teenagers was even steeper. A closer examination of the relative employment rate of youth (plotted in the bottom line in fig. 1) suggests that it has been trending downward over the past 40 years, with discrete declines after each of the last four recessions (in 1982–83, 1991, 2001, and 2007–9). Viewed from this perspective, the Great Recession is just the latest in a long series of setbacks for young workers. Of course, employment is only part of the story. Given smaller family sizes and higher incomes, an increasing fraction of US families may decide

Strikes and Wages: A Test of an Asymmetric Information Model

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1990 105(3), 625
This paper describes a simple model of labor disputes based on the hypothesis that unions use strikes to infer the profitability of the firm. The model posits the existence of a negatively sloped resistance curve between wages and strike duration. In addition, it offer a series of predictions relating wage and strike outcomes to changes in the expected profitability of the firm and changes in the alternative opportunities of striking workers. These implications are tested using data on wage outcomes, strike probabilities, and strike durations for a large sample of collective bargaining agreements.

The Effect of Unions on the Structure of Wages: A Longitudinal Analysis

Econometrica 1996 64(4), 957
This paper studies the effects of unions on the structure of wages using an estimation technique that accounts for misclassification errors in reported union status and potential correlations between union status and unobserved productivity. The model is estimated separately for five skill groups using a panel data set formed from the U.S. Current Population Survey. The results suggest that unions raise wages more for workers with lower levels of observed skills. Union workers are positively selected from the population of workers with lower levels of observed skill and negatively selected from the population with higher observed skills. Copyright 1996 by The Econometric Society.

Nine Facts about Top Journals in Economics

Journal of Economic Literature 2013 51(1), 144-161
How has publishing in top economics journals changed since 1970? Using a data set that combines information on all articles published in the top-five journals from 1970 to 2012 with their Google Scholar citations, we identify nine key trends. First, annual submissions to the top-five journals nearly doubled from 1990 to 2012. Second, the total number of articles published in these journals actually declined from 400 per year in the late 1970s to 300 per year most recently. As a result, the acceptance rate has fallen from 15 percent to 6 percent, with potential implications for the career progression of young scholars. Third, one journal, the American Economic Review, now accounts for 40 percent of top-five publications, up from 25 percent in the 1970s. Fourth, recently published papers are on average three times longer than they were in the 1970s, contributing to the relative shortage of journal space. Fifth, the number of authors per paper has increased from 1.3 in 1970 to 2.3 in 2012, partly offsetting the fall in the number of articles per year. Sixth, citations for top-five publications are high: among papers published in the late 1990s, the median number of Google Scholar citations is 200. Seventh, the ranking of journals by citations has remained relatively stable, with the notable exception of the Quarterly Journal of Economics, which climbed from fourth place to first place over the past three decades. Eighth, citation counts are significantly higher for longer papers and those written by more coauthors. Ninth, although the fraction of articles from different fields published in the top five has remained relatively stable, there are important cohort trends in the citations received by papers from different fields, with rising citations to more recent papers in Development and International, and declining citations to recent papers in Econometrics and Theory. (JEL A14)

Skill‐Biased Technological Change and Rising Wage Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles

Journal of Labor Economics 2002 20(4), 733-783
The recent rise in wage inequality is usually attributed to skill-biased technical change (SBTC), associated with new computer technologies. We review the evidence for this hypothesis, focusing on the implications of SBTC for overall wage inequality and for changes in wage differentials between groups. A key problem for the SBTC hypothesis is that wage inequality stabilized in the 1990s despite continuing advances in computer technology; SBTC also fails to explain the evolution of other dimensions of wage inequality, including the gender and racial wage gaps and the age gradient in the return to education.

Bargaining Power, Strike Durations, and Wage Outcomes: An Analysis of Strikes in the 1880s

Journal of Labor Economics 1995 13(1), 32-61
Strike outcomes in the 1880s had a "winner-take-all" character. Successful strikes ended with a discrete wage gain; failed strikes ended with a return to work at the prestrike wage. We present a theoretical interpretation of these outcomes based on a war-of-attrition model. We fit an empirical model specifying the capitulation times of the two parties and the size of the wage gain in the event of a strike success. The results show a systematic relation between the determinants of strike success and the determinants of the wage gain for a successful strike.

Design-Based Research in Empirical Microeconomics

American Economic Review 2022 112(6), 1773-1781
I briefly review the emergence of “ design-based” research methods in labor economics in the 1980s and early 1990s. These methods were seen as a partial solution to the problems of credible inference identified by Ashenfelter (1974), Leamer (1978), Hendry (1980), and others. Designed-based studies typically use a simplified one-equation model of the outcome of interest—in contrast to model-based studies that specify a data generating process for all factors determining the outcome. I discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of the design-based approach and the value of such research in the field. (JEL C20, J01, J24, J31, J38, J51, J53)

Who Set Your Wage?

American Economic Review 2022 112(4), 1075-1090
I discuss the recent literature that has led to new interest in the idea of monopsonistic wage setting. Building on advances in search theory and in models of differentiated products, researchers have used a number of different strategies to identify the elasticity of firm-specific labor supply. A growing consensus is that firms have some wage-setting power, though many questions remain about the sources of that power. (JEL B21, D21, D24, D43, J22, J31, J42)