Why do so few mutual fund families launch so many funds and styles around the world? We argue that launching numerous funds on an increasingly granular style grid allows incumbent families to congest the product space and deter market entry. Key to this argument is the persistently low dimensionality of the mutual fund product space, a fact we establish by analyzing the names of over 40,000 equity funds sold in 91 countries between 1931 and 2015. Over time, the strategy of filling up the style grid has led to the dominance of few families offering large, granular, and similar fund menus.

In their foreign portfolio allocations, international mutual funds overweight industries that are comparatively large in their domestic stock market. Aggregate excess foreign industry allocations are sizeable, on average amounting to over 100% for the largest domestic industries. While this foreign industry bias partly reflects familiarity-based motives, a large body of evidence on investment and performance patterns is, on the whole, remarkably consistent with a specialized learning motive contributing to the bias. This suggests that differences in industry structures across domestic stock markets proxy for international information asymmetries. Received January 14, 2015; editorial decision October 5, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

We study the link between information barriers in global markets and the organizational form of asset management. Fund families outsource funds in which they are at an informational disadvantage to generate performance. Using a structural model of self-selection, we endogenize the outsourcing decision and estimate positive gains from outsourcing of 4–14 basis points per month, thereby reconciling underperformance of outsourced funds with performance maximization by fund families. The gains from outsourcing provide a novel proxy for the information barriers that segment global financial markets: The more segmented the underlying markets where the funds invest, the larger the gains from outsourcing.

We exploit the merger between BlackRock and Barclays Global Investors to study how changes in expected ownership concentration affect the investment behavior of funds and the cross-section of stocks worldwide. We find that funds with open-end structures and large exposure to commonly held stocks begin avoiding these stocks following the merger announcement. This leads to a permanent change in the composition of institutional ownership and a negative price and liquidity impact. We confirm these results in a large sample of global asset management mergers. Our findings suggest that market participants behave strategically in response to changes in expected financial fragility.

We study outsourcing relationships among international asset management firms. We find that, in companies that manage both outsourced and in‐house funds, in‐house funds outperform outsourced funds by 0.85% annually (57% of the expense ratio). We attribute this result to preferential treatment of in‐house funds via the preferential allocation of IPOs, trading opportunities, and cross‐trades, especially at times when in‐house funds face steep outflows and require liquidity. We explain preferential treatment with agency problems: it increases with the subcontractor's market power and the difficulty of monitoring the subcontractor, and decreases with the subcontractor's amount of parallel in‐house activity.