This paper provides new evidence on the causes and consequences of herding by institutional investors. Using a comprehensive database of every transaction made by financial institutions in the German stock market, we show that institutions exhibit herding behavior on a daily basis. Herding intensity depends on stock characteristics including past returns and volatility. Return reversals indicate a destabilizing impact of herds on stock prices in the short term. Results from panel regressions suggest that herding is mainly unintentional and partly driven by the use of similar risk models. Our findings confirm the importance of macro-prudential aspects for banking regulation.

This paper investigates how the implementation of monetary policy affects the dynamics and the volatility of the federal funds rate. Since the early 1980s, the most important changes in the Fed’s conduct of monetary policy refer to the role of the federal funds rate target and the reserve requirement system. We show that the improved communication and transparency regarding the federal funds rate target has significantly increased the Fed’s influence on the federal funds rate since 1994. By contrast, the declining role of required reserves in the US has contributed to higher federal funds rate volatility. Our results suggest that the introduction of remunerated required reserves will further enhance the controllability of the federal funds rate.

The monetary setup of the European Central Bank (ECB) centers around short-term securities repurchase agreements (repos) which ensure the flexibility of its money market management. However, a flexible repo-based monetary policy exposes banks to both interest rate risk and liquidity risk. This paper investigates the consequences for the money supply process and the conduct of monetary policy. We develop a loan supply model with maturity transformation and show how banks respond when future monetary policy is expected to become tighter or more uncertain. Our results also shed light on the rationale behind the use of different pricing rules in the ECB's repo auctions.

This paper analyzes individual bidding data of the longer term refinancing operations (LTROs) of the European Central Bank. We investigate how banks’ bidding behavior is related to a series of exogenous variables including collateral costs, interest rate expectations, market volatility and to individual bank characteristics like country of origin, size, and experience. A specific feature of these auctions is that the number and composition of bidders varies over time. Therefore, we estimate panel sample selection models to control for a bank’s endogenous participation decision. We find that bidding strategies depend on the banks’ attributes. Yet, different bidding behavior generally does not translate into differences concerning bidder success. There is evidence for the winner’s curse effect in LTROs indicating a common value component in banks’ demand for longer term refinancing.