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A geographically weighted approach to measuring efficiency in panel data: The case of US saving banks

Journal of Banking & Finance 2013 37(10), 3747-3756
This paper discusses a new approach to controlling for the environment when estimating efficiency. In response to the literature on the international comparison of bank efficiency, we draw the attention to a local dimension of comparison. By introducing geographical weights and estimating local frontiers for each US savings bank in the 2001–09 period, we find that the bank technical performance is higher for most banks in comparison to a fixed-effects approach. This result highlights the importance of taking into account the local environment and constraints while analyzing banks’ performance, so as not to consider the factors that are exogenous to these institutions as inefficiencies. Further analysis could improve the weighs calculation by employing other measures of interconnectedness besides geographical distance.

Systemically important banks and financial stability: The case of Latin America

Journal of Banking & Finance 2013 37(10), 3855-3866
This paper addresses the issue on how bank size and market concentration affect performance and risks in 17 Latin American countries between 2001 and 2008. The objective is to evaluate whether a too-big-to-fail behavior has been present in the region. Surprisingly, we do not find evidence to support a higher fragility of large Latin American banks. Our results show that systemically important financial institutions appear to outperform others in terms of both cost and profit without the need of taking more risks. This result holds even in concentrated markets, i.e., where there are few dominant banks and many others with small size in relation to the market. A highly unequal banking market in terms of assets, however, is detrimental for the performance of smaller banks and it also decreases stability of the whole system. We conclude that regulators should deal with market concentration by reducing the size gap between large and small banks, instead of dealing specifically with systemically important banks.