Abstract We consider the behavior of leverage ratios in a trade-off model with investment. Debt underutilization to retain financial flexibility persists even when firms exercise their last investment options, and it is more (less) severe for more back-loaded (front-loaded) investment opportunities. Leverage paths crucially hinge on the structure of the investment process, which leads firms to have significantly different target leverage ratios. Structural estimation of key parameters reveals that simulated model moments can match data moments. In simulated panels, leverage regression results are in line with the evidence, and average leverage ratios are path-dependent and persistent for extended periods of time. (JEL G31, G32)

This article integrates an earnings-based capital structure model into a simple real options framework to analyze the effects of managerial optimism and overconfidence on the interaction between financing and investment decisions. Several empirical implications follow from solving the model. Notably, my analysis reveals that managerial traits can ameliorate bondholder–shareholder conflicts, such as the debt overhang problem. While debt delays investment inefficiently, mildly biased managers can overcome this problem, even though they tend to issue more debt. Similar properties and results are discussed for other real options, such as the asset stripping or risk-shifting problems.

Abstract This article examines how accounting transparency and corporate governance interact. Firms with better governance are associated with higher abnormal returns, but even more so if they also have higher transparency. The effect is largely monotonic—it is small and insignificant for opaque firms and large and significant for transparent firms—and survives numerous robustness tests. We find supportive evidence for firm value and operating performance. Hence, governance and transparency are complements. This complementarity effect is consistent with the view that more transparent firms are more likely takeover targets, because acquirers can bid more effectively and identify synergies more precisely.

We study the effect of asset tangibility on corporate financing and investment decisions. Financially constrained firms benefit the most from investing in tangible assets because those assets help relax constraints, allowing for further investment. Using a dynamic model, we characterize this effect — which we call firm-level credit multiplier — and show how asset tangibility increases the sensitivity of investment to Tobin’s Q for financially constrained firms. Examining a large sample of manufacturers over the 1971–2005 period as well as simulated data, we find support for our theory’s tangibility–investment channel. We further verify that our findings are driven by firms’ debt issuance activities. Consistent with our empirical identification strategy, the firm-level credit multiplier is absent from samples of financially unconstrained firms and samples of financially constrained firms with low spare debt capacity.

Investment-based asset pricing research highlights the role of irreversibility as a determinant of firms' risk and expected return. In a neoclassical model of a firm with costly scale adjustment options, we show that the effect of scale flexibility (i.e., contraction and expansion options) is to determine the relation between risk and operating leverage: risk increases with operating leverage for inflexible firms, but decreases for flexible firms. Guided by theory, we construct easily reproducible proxies for inflexibility and operating leverage. Empirical tests provide support for the predicted interaction of these characteristics in stock returns and risk.

We study distress risk premia around a bankruptcy reform that shifts bargaining power in financial distress from debtholders to shareholders. We find that the reform reduces risk factor loadings and returns of distressed stocks. The reform effect is stronger for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power. An increase in credit spreads of riskier relative to safer firms, in particular for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power, confirms a shift in bargaining power from bondholders to shareholders. Out-of-sample tests reveal that a reversal of the reform's effect leads to a reversal of factor loadings and returns.

Theoretical research in corporate finance is critical for our understanding of real-world phenomena, for interpreting empirical results, and for deriving policy implications. We discuss the benefits and limitations of research in corporate finance theory and link them to the nine articles in this special issue on “Corporate Finance Theory.” We provide a perspective on the nine articles in this special issue, and outline our perception of how future research may evolve. We also review several themes that emerge out of the articles, which we think deserve more attention from theorists going forward: interactions between financial markets and corporate finance and dynamic models of corporate decisions, such as capital structure and managerial compensation.

We examine the asset pricing implications of a neoclassical model of repeated investment and disinvestment. Prior research has emphasized a negative relation between productivity and equity risk that results from operating leverage when capital adjustment is costly. In general, however, expansion and contraction options affect risk in the opposite direction: they lower equity risk as profitability declines. The general prediction is a non-monotonic overlay of opposing real option and operating leverage effects. For parameters chosen to match empirical firm characteristics, the predicted non-monotonicities are quantitatively important, and are detectable in the data. The calibrated model implies that real option effects dominate operating leverage effects, and the average firm is best described by an increasing risk profile, a conclusion supported by conditional beta estimates. The baseline calibration helps explain the profitability premium in the cross-section, but makes the value puzzle worse. Panels with heterogeneous firms can deliver simultaneous profitability and value effects that match empirical levels.

Recent research establishes a negative relation between stock returns and dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts, arguing that asset prices more reflect the views of optimistic investors because of short-sale constraints in equity markets. In this article, we examine whether a similar effect prevails in corporate bond markets. After controlling for common bond-level, firm-level, and macroeconomic variables, we find evidence that bonds of firms with higher dispersion demand significantly higher credit spreads than otherwise similar bonds and that changes in dispersion reliably predict changes in credit spreads. This evidence suggests a limited role of short-sale constraints in our corporate bond data sets. Consistent with a rational explanation, dispersion appears to proxy largely for future cash flow uncertainty in corporate bond markets.

We study the interaction between financing and investment decisions in a dynamic model, where the firm has multiple debt issues and equityholders choose the timing of investment. Jointly optimal capital and priority structures can virtually eliminate investment distortions because debt priority serves as a dynamically optimal contract. Examining the relative efficiency of priority rules observed in practice, we develop several predictions about how firms adjust their priority structure in response to changes in leverage, credit conditions, and firm fundamentals. Notably, financially unconstrained firms with few growth opportunities prefer senior debt, while financially constrained firms, with or without growth opportunities, prefer junior debt. Moreover, lower-rated firms are predicted to spread priority across debt classes. Finally, our analysis has a number of important implications for empirical capital structure research, including the relations between market leverage, book leverage, and credit spreads and Tobin's Q, the influence of firm fundamentals on the agency cost of debt, and the conservative debt policy puzzle.