This paper analyzes the asset pricing implications of commonly used portfolio management contracts linking the compensation of fund managers to the excess return of the managed portfolio over a benchmark portfolio. The contract parameters, the extent of delegation, and equilibrium prices are all determined endogenously within the model we consider. Symmetric (fulcrum) performance fees distort the allocation of managed portfolios in a way that induces a significant and unambiguous positive effect on the prices of the assets included in the benchmark and a negative effect on the Sharpe ratios. Asymmetric performance fees have more complex effects on equilibrium prices and Sharpe ratios, with the signs of these effects fluctuating stochastically over time in response to variations in the funds' excess performance.

We examine the extent to which an investor's tastes and beliefs can be jointly recovered from knowledge of his/her consumption choice. More precisely, we assume that the investor's preferences admit an expected utility representation, but with subjective (unknown) probabilities, and investigate what joint restrictions can be placed on utility functions and beliefs. If the investor draws utility from intertemporal consumption, we show that the set of utility functions and beliefs that are consistent with a given consumption choice can be characterized by a martingale condition. In the Markovian case, this characterization can be restated in terms of a Riccati differential equation that must be satisfied by the investor's relative risk aversion function. To each solution of this differential equation is associated a unique utility function and a unique set of beliefs supporting the given consumption choice. Moreover, we show that the differential equation has at most one solution in the class of utility functions displaying infinite absolute risk aversion at the origin. Thus, preferences (and associated beliefs) can be uniquely recovered within this class.

We study the behavior of a financial institution subject to capital requirements based on self-reported VaR measures, as in the Basel Committee's Internal Models Approach. We view these capital requirements and the associated backtesting procedure as a mechanism designed to induce financial institutions to reveal the risk of their investments and to support this risk with adequate levels of capital. Accordingly, we consider the simultaneous choice of an optimal dynamic reporting and investment strategy. Overall, we find that VaR-based capital requirements can be very effective not only in curbing portfolio risk but also in inducing revelation of this risk.

This article solves the equilibrium problem in a pure-exchange, continuous-time economy in which some agents face information costs or other types of frictions effectively preventing them from investing in the stock market. Under the assumption that the restricted agents have logarithmic utilities, a complete characterization of equilibrium prices and consumption/ investment policies is provided. A simple calibration shows that the model can help resolve some of the empirical asset pricing puzzles. It is well documented that even in well-developed capital markets, a large fraction of households does not participate in the stock market. For example, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) report that 72.4 % of the households in a representative sample from the 1984 Panel Study of Income Dynamics held no stocks at all. 1 These households earned 62 % of the aggregate disposable income and accounted for 68 % of aggre-We thank Steve Shreve for several conversations on this topic and Kerry