Donald Palmer of University of California, Davis reviews, “The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite” by Mark S. Mizruchi. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Examines the rise and fall of the American corporate elite between 1945 and the present and considers the role of this decline in the current crises of American democracy and economics. Discusses the rise of the American corporate elite; the state and the economy; labor as uneasy partner; the banks as mediators; the breakdown of the postwar consensus; winning the war but losing the battle—the fragmentation of the American corporate elite; the aftermath; and the ineffectual elite. Mizruchi is Barger Family Professor of Organizational Studies and Professor of Sociology and Business Administration at the University of Michigan.”

This article examines the impact of unemployment insurance (UI) on the allocation of labor across industries. An overlooked aspect of UI is the effect of imperfect experience rating on hiring. Firms in more stable industries generally pay more into the UI system than their workers ever receive in benefits, thus subsidizing more volatile industries. The results indicate that industry employment shares are significantly affected by UI and that there is a net shift of resources from the service industry to the construction industry. The estimates also imply that layoff unemployment is increased by about 5% because of UI-induced employment shifts.

Uskali Maki read three books by McCloskey on the "rhetoric of economics" with sympathy. But he wants McCloskey to choose between a coherence and a correspondence theory of truth. McCloskey notes in reply that modern epistemology - by contrast with the analytic philosophy circa 1955 that many philosophers of economics espouse - rejects the choice. Modern epistemology would say that economic scientists argue in many legitimate ways, governed by ethics. In brief, as Maki agrees, economics has a rhetoric. Rhetoric is a better guide than 1955-style analytic philosophy.

Using variation in payday lending restrictions over time and across states, we study competition in the market for small, short-term consumer loans. We find that banks and credit unions reduce overdraft credit limits and prices when payday credit, a possible substitute, is prohibited. These findings suggest that depositories respond to payday loan bans by taking less risk, bouncing checks that they would have otherwise covered. The decline in overdraft prices is surprising when viewed in isolation, but sensible given that depositories incur lower credit losses as they limit overdraft coverage. We find some evidence that credit unions’ overdraft activities are more profitable when payday loans are prohibited, consistent with decreased competition. In addition to characterizing the impact of prohibiting payday lending, a common state policy change in recent years, our findings illuminate competition in the small-dollar loan market by highlighting the importance of non-price adjustments to credit offers.

A growing body of evidence indicates that liquidity constraints could affect a substantial proportion of U. S. consumers, but little is known about why these constraints might exist. An important, but little-explored, issue is the relationship between inter vivos intergenerational transfers and liquidity constraints. These transfers can ease borrowing constraints. Empirical transfer patterns match those predicted from a model in which transfers are allocated to liquidity-constrained consumers. In particular, the distinction between current and permanent incomes of potential recipients is a key aspect of private-transfer behavior. The findings have important implications for our understanding of consumer behavior.

Returns computed with closing bid or ask prices that may not represent ‘true’ prices introduce measurement error into portfolio returns if investor buying and selling display systematic patterns. This paper finds systematic tendencies for closing prices to be recorded at the bid in December and at the ask in early January. After changing bid and ask prices are controlled for. this pattern results in large portfolio returns on the two trading days surrounding the end of the year, especially for low-price stocks. Other temporal return patterns (e.g. weekend and holiday effects) are also related to systematic trading patterns.