This paper provides evidence that managers adjust firm advertising, in part, to attract investor attention and influence short-term stock returns. First, I show that increased advertising spending is associated with a contemporaneous rise in retail buying and abnormal stock returns, and is followed by lower future returns. Second, I document a significant increase in advertising spending prior to insider sales and a significant decrease in the subsequent year. Additional analyses suggest that the inverted V-shaped pattern in advertising spending around insider sales is most consistent with managers' opportunistically adjusting firm advertising to exploit the temporary return effect to their own benefit. © The Author 2014.

We exploit a novel setting in which the same piece of information affects two sets of firms: one set of firms requires straightforward processing to update prices, while the other set requires more complicated analyses to incorporate the same piece of information into prices. We document substantial return predictability from the set of easy-to-analyze firms to their more complicated peers. Specifically, a simple portfolio strategy that takes advantage of this straightforward vs. complicated information processing classification yields returns of 118 basis points per month before transaction costs. Consistent with processing complexity driving the return relation, we further show that the more complicated the firm, the more pronounced the return predictability. In addition, we find that sell-side analysts are subject to these same information processing constraints, as their forecast revisions of easy-to-analyze firms predict their future revisions of more complicated firms.

UK government bond yields tend to drift upwards before scheduled news such as monetary policy announcements and labour market data releases. This effect is particularly pronounced during periods of UK bond issuance and is linked to higher term premia. Financial intermediary constraints play a role as dealers avoid accumulating inventory in pre-news windows following issuance. The composition of liquidity providers also shifts: hedge funds buy a large share of the bond issuance outside pre-news windows, but more passive investors – such as foreign central banks and pension funds – provide liquidity in pre-news windows. We outline a simple model to rationalize these findings.

We show that Treasury security prices in the secondary market decrease significantly in the few days before Treasury auctions and recover shortly thereafter, even though the time and amount of each auction are announced in advance. These results are linked to dealers' limited risk-bearing capacity and end-investors' imperfect capital mobility, highlighting the important role of frictions even in very liquid financial markets. Our results imply a hidden issuance cost to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, estimated to be 9 to 18 bps of the auction size, or over half a billion dollars for the issuance size in 2007.