This paper investigates theoretically and empirically the dynamics of the implied volatility or implied standard deviation (ISD) around earnings announcements dates. The volatility implied by option prices can be interpreted as the level of volatility expected by the market over the remaining life of the option. We propose a theoretical framework for the evolution of the ISD that takes into account two well-known features of the instantaneous volatility: volatility clustering and the leverage effect. In this context, the ISD should decrease after an earnings announcement but the post-announcement ISD path depends on the content of the earnings announcement: good news or bad news. An empirical investigation is conducted on the Swiss market over the period 1989–1998.

This article analyses founding family influence on pay-out policies for Swiss listed firms over the period 2003–2010. We hypothesise that family firms have different incentives and characteristics that affect pay-out decisions and propose three possible explanations: agency theory, reputation building and family income needs. Our results show that founding family firms display significantly higher dividend pay-outs relative to companies with other ownership structures. We also examine specific family characteristics and document that a family's stake, active involvement and generation play an important role in determining pay-out policies. Our findings appear to be consistent with the family income hypothesis and to some extent with reputational concerns.

This paper explores the relationship between founding family ownership and stock market returns. Using the entire population of non-financial firms listed on the Swiss stock market for 2003–2013, we find that the stock returns of family firms are significantly higher than those of non-family firms after adjusting the returns for different firm characteristics and risk factors. Family firms generate an annual abnormal return of 2.8% to 7.1%. We also document that family firms potentially having more agency problems earn higher abnormal returns. Our evidence suggests that outside investors receive a premium for holding shares of these firms as they are exposed to the specific agency problems present in family firms.

This paper examines how family and non-family ownership affects the performance of Swiss listed firms from 2003 to 2010. We distinguish between these two types of controlling shareholders since they have different objectives. We hypothesise that only family shareholders have a real incentive to reduce agency costs whereas non-family blockholders are similar to widely held companies. Our results show that family firms are more profitable than companies that are widely held or have a non-family blockholder. For market valuations we find that the family stake plays a critical role and document a concave relationship between family ownership and Tobin’s Q. We also investigate the impact of different features of family firms on performance, and document that the generation of the family and the active involvement of the family play an important role for market valuation.

We study the effect of dividend taxes on the payout and investment policies of publicly listed firms. We exploit a unique setting in Switzerland where, following the corporate tax reform of 2011, some but not all firms were suddenly able to pay tax-exempt dividends. We show that treated firms increase their dividend payout by around 30% after the tax cut. The effect on payout is less pronounced for firms prone to agency conflicts. We find a significant positive abnormal stock return after the announcement of the payment of a tax-exempt dividend. However, reducing dividend taxes does not boost investment.