2 Of the many frustrations of any editor, surely, avoidable delay is the greatest. And this frustration is almost infinitely compounded when in the interim an unexpected death occurs. Professor Ferguson sent this manuscript as a draft; certain questions which he raised in the accompanying letter would normally have been resolved in the exchange of two or three letters or 'phone calls. I placed one call to learn he was ill; rather than press the query, I delayed. When next I 'phoned, I was shocked to learn of his completely unexpected and therefore all the more untimely death. Because the draft he sent contains so much of his own style and vigor, I have elected to print it in this incomplete form. The points he raised in his letter remain unclarified. In the face of this series of events, I have asked Professor Nell to undertake the task initially given to Ferguson. The two rarely saw things in the same way. Thus, the choice of Nell was not intended to finish Ferguson's incomplete assessment. I mention the foregoing simply to explain the unique treatment in these review essays. Of Charles Ferguson's death so little can be said-he was an ebullient souil, and a man of significant originality. -M. P.

MILTON FRIEDMAN AND ANNA SCHWARTZ Monetary Trends reports a great many findings-53 are enumerated in the introduction-but paramount is the stability of the demand for money in the US and Britain over the past century. The money stock controls money income. This proposition more than anything else is the point of their painstaking investigation. Friedman and Schwartz argue against what might neutrally be called the early post-war view of the macroeconomic role of money: Velocity will move easily to reconcile any level of nominal income to any money stock. The demand for money in this view is a will-o'the-wisp, as the authors put it. Monetary policy has little influence over real activity; stabilization policy necessarily relies on fiscal instruments. The volume is completely convincing in disposing of this idea; today's reader is likely to be puzzled why so much space is devoted to a view that has no serious adherents among professional economists. Friedman and Schwartz are generals fighting an earlier war, a situation accentuated by the long lags in putting this volume into print. Though the opposing armies fighting for the early postwar view have withdrawn in total rout, a new front has opened up, and the quantity theory is fighting for its life once again. Worse yet, the new armies are fighting under the banner of free-market economics and are led by former colleagues and students of Milton Friedman. The midwest, once the stronghold of the quantity theory, is now largely occupied by the enemy. The new monetary economics views the quantity theory as nothing more than an artifact of government regulation. An economy organized along free-market principles could function without money at all (Fischer Black, 1970). It is true that the kinds of monetary regulations imposed by the American and British governments of the past century create a more-or-less stable relation between a certain class of assets called money and nominal spending (Eugene Fama, 1980), but different regulations would alter that relation. Even the real bills doctrine, anathema to quantity theorists because it invites unlimited expansion of the money supply, has advocates in the new school (Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace, 1981). monetary system where the government is unconcerned about the money stock has been advocated by a University of Chicago economist while visiting the Hoover Institution (John Bilson, 1981). Restoring the intrinsic value of money, not limiting its quantity, has been found to be the key to successful disinflation by one member of this group (Sargent, 1982). critical summary, titled A Laissez Faire Approach to Monetary Stability, written * See p. 1528, above, for publication information.

We suggest that transparent bias in management disclosures may result from managers processing information in a heuristic, as distinct from Bayesian, fashion when they face imperfect or head-to-head competition. We predict that transparent bias in disclosures is positively related to the extent of head-to-head competition. In addition, when disclosure is discretionary, we show that managers who exhibit viable, heuristic behavior are less likely to disclose than managers who exhibit Bayesian behavior. Finally, when disclosure is discretionary, we show that the increase in the proportion of uninformed managers who exhibit viable, heuristic behavior encourages more disclosure by an informed manager.

We characterize the steady-state equilibrium in which informed traders who exhibit heuristic (i.e., representativeness, as opposed to Bayesian) and Bayesian behaviors achieve the same expected utility. Then, we show how the endogenous, steady-state proportion of heuristic traders is affected by the quality of public information and other exogenous features of our model. Finally, we discuss how the presence of heuristic traders potentially alters the link between improved public disclosure and market liquidity, the variance in the change in price, and market efficiency.

This paper describes the balance sheet adjustments of debt and equity financed firms over time in an economy subject to taste shocks. A model is developed that describes a representative firm with a stochastic diminishing returns technology and a set of financial contracts that resolve a conflict-of-interest problem between differentially risk-averse bondholders and stockholders. The contractual resolution of this conflict-of-interest problem between the two agents is shown to shape certain stylized facts of business cycles ignored in Keynesian and Classical models. Changes in investor risk aversion and equity valuations trigger real investment decisions that can cause business cycles. Bond covenants then have the firm adjusting its financing decisions so as to offset any risk-shifting associated with the investment decisions. Stockholders manage the asset side of the firm’s balance sheet while bondholders (regulators in the case of banks) manage the financing side. In this way the welfare of both investors is coalesced over the business cycle. A similar type of analysis accounts for the age distribution of workers, and the size distribution of firms over the business cycle. Evidence presented here and elsewhere fails to reject these predictions for the U.S. non-financial and financial corporate sectors.

In this paper we show in a thought experiment that in an economy where i) investors hold rational expectations, ii) output is generated by a linear homogeneous production function, and iii) real investment is allocated across sectors according to the CAPM, a fractional reserve banking system is not Pareto efficient and amplifies the business cycle. In developing these results we show that these three well known propositions in economics also imply a new view of the business cycle, one where the business cycle is described in terms of the dispersion of an ex-ante probability distribution. The policy implication of this analysis is that bank regulation should go further than the Volcker rule or the Vickers commission proposal by restricting bank investments to currency and deposit accounts on the central bank. Nonbank financial institutions should then carry out the financial intermediation function now carried out by banks. The paper proposes that post office banking perhaps augmented with blockchain technology sometime in the future is one way to implement the transition from fractional reserve banking to full reserve banking. While little academic work has been done on full reserve banking in the aftermath of the Great Crisis, it is interesting to note that it is part of banking reform proposals now (July 2016) before the parliament in Iceland and a special national referendum in Switzerland.