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This article considers a two-sided search market where firms and workers are paired to bargain over a unit surplus. The matching market serves as an endogenous outside option for the agents. The market includes inflexible commitment types who demand a constant portion of any match surplus. The frequency of such types is determined in equilibrium.An equilibrium where there are significant delays in reaching an agreement and where negotiations occasionally break down on the equilibrium path is constructed. Such an equilibrium exists and commitment types affect bargaining dynamics even if the equilibrium frequency of such types is negligible. If the inflows of firms and workers into the market are symmetric, then bargaining involves two-sided reputation building and reputation concerns lead to delays and inefficiency. Access to the market exacerbates bargaining inefficiencies caused by inflexible types. If the inflows of workers and firms are sufficiently asymmetric, then bargaining involves one-sided reputation and commitment types determine the terms of trade.

The SEED schools, which combine a “No Excuses” charter model with a 5-day-a-week boarding program, are America’s only urban public boarding schools for the poor. We provide the first causal estimate of the impact of attending SEED schools on academic achievement, with the goal of understanding whether changing a student’s environment is an effective strategy to increase achievement among the poor. Using admission lotteries, we show that attending a SEED school increases achievement by 0.211 standard deviation in reading and 0.229 standard deviation in math per year. However, subgroup analyses show that the effects may be driven by female students.

Disparate commitments to reduce GHG emissions create demands for border carbon adjustments (BCAs) to prevent negative competitive effects and carbon leakage. BCAs that accomplish economic objectives and are administratively feasible, WTO-legal, and politically acceptable may be impossible. BCAs should be limited to a few basic energy-intensive and trade-exposed products and should be based on the lower of the carbon content of production in the importing country and actual carbon content, or perhaps “best available technology.” Whether the World Trade Organization (WTO) would condone BCAs is unclear. BCAs violating basic trade rules might qualify for a special exception.

We use the revealed preference method to derive a model of individual decision making when the endowment of an agent provides a reference point that may influence her choices. This model generalizes the classical rational choice model, which views choice as a consequence of “utility maximization”. Instead, our model sees choice as arising from “psychologically constrained utility maximization”, where the constraints are induced by one's initial endowment. In particular, this model produces status quo bias as a natural consequence (but not necessarily the endowment effect). A range of economic applications identify the predictive and explanatory strength of the model. In particular, we demonstrate that the status quo bias phenomenon reduces the size of the substitution effect in problems of consumption choice.

This note proposes a new decomposition of average treatment effects on nonnegative outcomes. It represents the total effect as a population-weighted sum of the effects for two groups: those induced to participate by the treatment and those participating regardless of it. The usual decomposition into extensive and intensive margins used in the literature is generally incompatible with such a causal interpretation. The difference between decompositions can be substantial and yield diametrically opposed results.

We study a uniform-price auction where k identical common-value objects are allocated amongst z > k bidders who have imperfect signals about the state of the world. The common valuation is determined jointly by the state and an action that is chosen after winning an object. In large auctions, there are symmetric equilibria where the auction price aggregates no information. Moreover, market statistics other than price (e.g., the amount of rationing or the bid distribution) contain extra information about the state. In contrast, in standard large auctions without actions, the price aggregates all relevant information. (JEL D44, D82, D83)