Using the natural experiment created by France's 2011 board gender quota law, we find that the presence of women on boards increases firms' environmental and social (E&S) performance. After the quota law, firms are more likely to create an E&S committee, and women directors are increasingly serving as members of the main board committees and as chairs of E&S committees. We find that prior to being recruited to boards, women directors have more environmental and social experience than men. Combined with their increased authority after the introduction of quotas, their E&S skills allow them to steer companies toward more E&S-oriented policies.

We analyze the reasons why companies issue units when they raise additional capital. We find that, in contrast to previous evidence, units are not offered to mitigate the agency conflicts or to signal security mispricing as they are predominantly issued during cold periods, in public rather than in rights offerings, and when the issue is underwritten. In addition, the results indicate that companies choose to offer units to increase their offer price flexibility and to underprice their seasoned equity offering so as to minimize the issue cost and the risk of failure of the issue. These results provide support for the net proceeds maximization hypothesis.

We examine board structure in France, which since 1966 has allowed firms the freedom to choose between unitary and two-tier boards. We analyze how this choice relates to characteristics of the firm and its environment. Firms with severe asymmetric information tend to opt for unitary boards; firms with a potential for private benefits extraction tend to adopt two-tier boards. Chief executive officer turnover is more sensitive to performance at firms with two-tier boards, indicating greater monitoring. Our results are broadly consistent with the Adams and Ferreira (2007) model and suggest that gains result from allowing freedom of contract about board structure.