This paper studies the assignment of people to projects over time in a model with private information. The combination of risk neutrality with incomplete contracts that restrict the ability of an agent to report on interim states is a force for long-term assignments. More generally, however, rotating agents can be valuable because it conceals information from agents, which mitigates incentive constraints. With complete contracts that communicate interim states, rotation allows for even more concealment possibilities and better-targeted incentives. Furthermore, it allows for the reporting of interim shocks at no cost to the principal. Properties of the production technology are also shown to matter. Substitutability of intertemporal effort is a force for long-term assignments, while coordination with Nash equilibrium strategies is a force for job rotation.

We incorporate multiagent, principal‐agent theory into general equilibrium analysis. The traded commodities are multiagent contracts that include a description of the individual’s job, effort level, and state‐contingent consumption. These contracts are club goods. The competitive equilibrium and the Pareto program are formulated. The contracts are identified with firms, so the market determines which firms exist and who is assigned to which firm in what capacity. An example is provided in which the internal organization of firms and the distribution of firm classes vary with the aggregate capital endowment and its distribution across agents. A simplex‐based algorithm for solving the Pareto program is developed.

Many economic agents take corrective actions based on information inferred from market prices of firms’ securities. Examples include directors and activists intervening in the management of firms and bank supervisors taking actions to improve the health of financial institutions. We provide an equilibrium analysis of such situations in light of a key problem: if agents use market prices when deciding on corrective actions, prices adjust to reflect this use and potentially become less revealing. We show that market information and agents’ information are complementary, and discuss measures that can increase agents’ ability to learn from market prices.

Failures and FDIC losses for community banks during the banking crises of the late 1980s and late 2000s are compared. Despite increases in risky commercial real estate (CRE) lending and more severe economic shocks in the recent crisis, failure rates were lower. We find that other changes in bank characteristics, like higher capital, made community banks more resilient to shocks. In contrast, FDIC losses on failed banks were higher. These are not explained by changes in CRE exposure or economic shocks. We find that an interest-receivable variable is predictive of failures and FDIC losses. Implications for prompt corrective action are discussed.