We employ a new data set comprised of disaggregate figures on clearing house loan certificate issues in New York City to document how the dominant national banks were crucial providers of temporary liquidity during the Panic of 1907. Clearing house loan certificates were extensions of credit by the New York Clearing House to its members. These certificates were transferable to other clearing house members as a form of final payment for settlement of interbank payments. The certificate issues allowed borrowing banks to maintain (and increase) loans, fulfill cash payment upon depositor withdrawal demands, and enabled gold imports, which took two to three weeks to arrive. The large, New York City national banks acted as private liquidity providers by requesting (and the New York Clearing House issuing) a volume of clearing house loan certificates in excess of their own immediate liquidity needs, in accord with their role as central reserve city banks in the national banking system.

We study the interactions among geographical mobility, unemployment, and home-ownership in an economy with heterogeneous locations, endogenous construction, and search frictions in the markets for both labour and housing. The decision of home-owners to accept job offers from other cities depends on how quickly they can sell their houses ( i.e. the houses' liquidity ), which in turn depends on local labour market conditions. Consequently, home-owners accept job offers from other cities at a lower rate than do renters, generating a link between home-ownership and unemployment both at the city level and in the aggregate. When calibrated to match aggregate U.S. statistics on mobility, housing, and labour flows, the model predicts that the effect of home-ownership on aggregate unemployment is small. When unemployment is high, however, changes in the rate of home-ownership can have economically significant effects.

This paper analyses various issues that need to be tackled when promoting financial stability, reviewing the progress made in certain key areas and the remaining challenges. It explores the measurement of systemic risk and of individual institutions’ contribution to it. It discusses aspects of macroprudential frameworks, including how the countercyclical capital buffer envisaged in Basel III takes into account the properties of the financial cycle and the strengths and weaknesses of macro-stress tests. It analyses some of the challenges of how best to monitor financial systems and the broader economy in order to detect signs of vulnerability that might lead to future bouts of financial instability and of how to set prudential policy accordingly. And it discusses the evolution of capital adequacy standards and the new emphasis on liquidity standards in international regulation.