This paper investigates long-term interdependencies and short-term dynamics in currency futures utilizing intraday data for six major foreign currencies: the British Pound, Deutsche Mark, Swiss Franc, Australian Dollar, Canadian Dollar, and Japanese Yen. Lack of cointegration (CI) among the foreign exchange futures is found to be the prevailing mode of behavior, but some temporary deviations from the no-CI condition are detected. There is a notable overlap between detected CI relationships and the timing of policy changes, world events, and regime shifts, indicating that the observed CIs are event-driven. The robustness of the CI results is checked with respect to variations in the model, lag structure, data period, sample horizon, and currency basket grouping. Impulse–response functions (IRFs) reveal that currency markets are in general efficient and absorb new information within the day. The interdependence among currencies is found to be asymmetric.

We study the relationship between bank failure and dedicated institutional ownership (hereafter IO) employing a logit model. We focus on dedicated institutional investors (hereafter IIs) as defined by Bushee (2001) and Bushee and NOE (2000) because they are stable shareholders and have large investments in the investee companies. Four results are obtained. First, based on the instrumental variable approach, a greater proportion of dedicated IO is associated with reduced probability of bank failure. This result is robust to the propensity score matching technique. The rationale is that dedicated IIs collect information on the investee banks by holding stable and concentrated positions in these banks, monitor them, and reduce their ownership in cases of trouble earlier than other IIs do. This effect has a larger magnitude in banks with greater organizational complexity and larger size. Second, after controlling for the sell herding effect of other IIs, we find that the dedicated IO proportion still has a negative and significant coefficient, indicating that dedicated IIs trade on fundamental information rather than herding with other IIs. Third, three potential channels of collecting information, (i) placing representatives on the board as directors, (ii) greater capacity in analyzing financial statements through cross-ownership in other banks, and (iii) higher monitoring incentive due to more stable and concentrated ownership, are investigated. We find evidence in favor of the effect of cross-ownership in the banking industry, ownership stability and concentration. Fourth, the ownership of dedicated IIs is significantly larger in banks acquired by other banks than those filing for Chapter 7 liquidation, ascribing a constructive role for dedicated IIs.

We investigate whether: (i) co-skewness and co-kurtosis are significant factors in modeling hedge fund (HF) returns, (ii) HF return volatility displays clusters, asymmetry and shock persistence, (iii) volatility clusters of HF styles drive volatility clusters of one another, major asset classes, and major banking organizations, (iv) HF return and volatility patterns changed after the financial crises of 1998 and 2007–2009. A higher-moment EGARCH model and monthly data over January 1993–April 2014 period on 13 HF styles are employed. Out-of-sample forecasts are generated over the period of May 2014–April 2016. Results show: (i) most of the co-skewness and co-kurtosis coefficients are statistically significant, strongly supporting the higher-moment return generating models; (ii) there is strong evidence in favor of EGARCH specification, volatility clustering, asymmetry, and shock persistence; (iii) there were distinct effects on the returns and volatilities of HFs during the 1998 Russian bond crisis, Long-Term Capital Management crisis, and the 2007–2009 financial crisis; and (iv) shocks to volatility clusters of a HF style do spillover to other HF styles, major banking firms, and key asset classes. Our findings have major implications for regulators, investors, HF managers and hedging strategists.

We examine the association between “busyness” of the board of directors (serving on multiple boards) and bank holding company (BHC) performance and risk. We estimate several simultaneous-equations models employing the 3SLS technique and instrumental variables to account for endogeneity. We obtain four main results. First, BHC performance measures (return on equity, Tobin’s Q and EBIT over total assets) are positively associated with busyness of directors. Second, BHC risk measures (total, market, idiosyncratic, credit and default risks) are inversely related to busyness of directors. Third, performance (risk) benefits of having busy directors strengthened (weakened) during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Fourth, busy directors are not more likely to become problem directors (fail the 75% attendance standard), and if sitting on boards of both BHC and non-financial firms, they attend more of the BHC board meetings, than those of the non-financials. Our findings partially alleviate concerns that over-boarded directors shirk their responsibilities.

CEO entrenchment distorts firms’ liquidity policy because entrenched CEOs and shareholders have conflicting preferences for liquidity. We investigate the association between firms’ liquidity level/mix and entrenchment within a system model accounting for endogeneity. Several results are obtained. Entrenched CEOs (i) hold more liquidity because it helps reduce their firm’s risks, provides them with job and wealth security, and gives them discretion in pursuing personal objectives; (ii) prefer cash over lines of credit (LCs) because the latter are accompanied by bank monitoring; and (iii) use more LCs, despite their associated monitoring, because they provide extra liquidity. Sample disaggregation shows that increased liquidity due to CEO entrenchment can be attributed to smaller and more opaque firms – large and transparent firms maintain their liquidity levels but increase their shares of cash. These findings imply that firms should align the interests of entrenched CEOs with those of shareholders to reduce the undesirable effects of entrenchment on liquidity management.

We investigate the relationship between insolvency risk and executive compensation for BHCs over the 1992–2008 period. We employ CEO compensation sensitivity to risk (vega) and pay-share inequality between the CEO and other executives as measures of compensation and employ a system model to account for the endogeneity problem between vega and risk. Five main results are obtained. First, CEO compensation sensitivity to risk of BHCs has risen in response to deregulation to resemble those of the industrial firms. Second, higher vegas lead to greater bank instability. Third, the association between bank stability and managerial compensation is bi-directional; higher vegas induce greater risk and vice versa. Fourth, BHCs in the next to the largest-size group increase CEO vegas the most and have the strongest potential to create instability. Fifth, increased pay-share inequality has effects opposite to those of the increase in vega; greater pay-share inequality is associated with greater stability.

We investigate the association between corporate firm performance and the level and stability of institutional ownership within a simultaneous equation model. Our main ownership stability measures include ownership persistence and the time-lengths over which investors hold non-zero shares or maintain their shareholding. We find that there is a positive relationship between firm performance and institutional ownership stability, accounting for the shareholding proportion. This relationship is robust to the employment of ownership turnover measures used in the literature and consistent with the view that stable institutional investors play an effective role in monitoring. When we disaggregate institutional investors into pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive categories, we find that stable shareholding of each group has a positive impact on performance, with the first group exerting a larger effect. The channels of the effect include, but are not limited to, decreased information asymmetry and increased incentive-based compensation.

The objective of this paper is to employ the generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic in the mean (GARCH-M) methodology to investigate the effect of interest rate and its volatility on the bank stock return generation process. This framework discards the restrictive assumptions of linearity, independence, and constant conditional variance in modeling bank stock returns. The model presented here allows for shifts in the volatility equation in response to the changes in monetary policy regime in 1979 and 1982 to be estimated. ARCH, GARCH, and volatility feed back effects are found to be significant. Interest rate and interest rate volatility are found to directly impact the first and the second moments of the bank stock returns distribution, respectively. The latter also affects the risk premia indirectly. The degree of persistence in shocks is substantial for all the three bank portfolios and sensitive to the nature of the bank portfolio and the prevailing monetary policy regime.