We test whether adverse changes to banks’ market valuations during the financial and sovereign debt crises affected firms’ real decisions. Using new data linking over 5000 non-financial Italian firms to their bank(s), we find that increases in banks’ CDS spreads, and decreases in their equity valuations, resulted in lower investment, employment, and bank debt for younger and smaller firms. These effects dominate those of banks’ balance-sheet variables. Moreover, CDS spreads matter more than equity valuations. Finally, higher CDS spreads led to lower aggregate investment and employment, and to less efficient resource allocations, especially during the sovereign debt crisis.

We empirically show the dynamics of information production and information sensitivity of bank debt around the Great Recession. As more precise information is produced at the onset of the crisis, bank debt becomes informationally sensitive, along two separate dimensions. First, precise information amplifies the effect of market expectations on default risk; second, for banks that are already expected to perform poorly, more precise information further increases default risk. Both effects are muted in good times. Overall, our findings are consistent with information-based models of financial crises.