We compare the trading performance of independent directors and other executives. The findings reveal that independent directors earn positive substantial abnormal returns when they purchase their company stock, and that the difference from the same firm's executives is relatively small at most horizons. We also find that executives and independent directors make higher returns in firms with the weakest governance, the gap between these two widens in such firms, and that independent directors sitting on the audit committee earn higher returns than other independent directors at the same firm. Independent directors also earn significantly abnormal returns when they sell the company stock in a window before bad news and around earnings restatements. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Drawing on a novel database of the 401(k) plans of 296 firms, we examine the international equity allocations of 3.8 million individuals over the 2005–2011 period. We find enormous cross-individual variation, ranging from zero to more than 75%, and strong cohort effects, with younger cohorts investing more internationally than older ones and each cohort investing more internationally over time. Access to financial advice, lower fees, and more international fund choices are associated with higher international allocations, suggesting a role for plan design and policy. Education, financial literacy, and the fraction of foreign-born population in the ZIP code also have positive effects on international diversification, consistent with explanations based on familiarity bias and information barriers.

We estimate institutional investor preferences from proxy voting records. The W-NOMINATE method maps investors onto a left-right dimension based on votes for fiscal year 2012. Public pension funds and other investors on the left support a more social and environment-friendly orientation of the firm and fewer executive compensation proposals. “Money-conscious” investors appear on the right. The proxy advisor ISS makes voting recommendations that place it center, to the left of most large mutual funds. A second dimension reflects a more traditional governance view, with management-disciplinarian investors, the proxy advisor Glass Lewis among them, pitted against more management-friendly ones.