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The Effect of Mandatory Disclosure Dissemination on Information Asymmetry among Investors: Evidence from the Implementation of the EDGAR System

The Accounting Review 2024 99(1), 235-257
I study the effect of the implementation of the SEC’s EDGAR system on information asymmetry among investors. The SEC adopted EDGAR to decrease acquisition costs of mandatory filings. However, disclosure theory suggests that, even when acquisition costs are low, integration costs (i.e., costs necessary to filter and interpret information signals) may be so high that less sophisticated investors are disadvantaged, relative to their sophisticated peers. Consistent with this theory, I find evidence that EDGAR increased information asymmetries among investors. This result is more pronounced for firms with higher integration costs—i.e., those with more complex filings and filings that have higher information content—as well as for firms with lower analyst coverage. Overall, my results suggest that, although EDGAR lowered acquisition costs for all investors, it also benefited some investors at the expense of others. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation and Non-GAAP Income Statements

The Accounting Review 2023 98(2), 149-175
We study firms’ decisions to provide non-GAAP income statements and the information environment consequences of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letters directing them to stop disclosing such statements. We find firms voluntarily disclose non-GAAP income statements when firm and disclosure complexity, analyst following, and institutional ownership are higher. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that, after firms stop disclosing full non-GAAP income statements at the direction of the SEC, the informativeness of non-GAAP earnings and overall earnings announcements decreases, information asymmetry increases, and analyst forecasts become less accurate and more disperse. We also find that firms not receiving a comment letter are more likely to stop providing non-GAAP income statements after an industry peer receives a non-GAAP income statement comment letter. Overall, our evidence suggests SEC comment letters about non-GAAP income statements appear to worsen the information environment for firms previously providing those statements. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.