This paper examines debt structure using a new and comprehensive database on types of debt employed by public U.S. firms. We find that 85% of the sample firms borrow predominantly with one type of debt, and the degree of debt specialization varies widely across different subsamples—large rated firms tend to diversify across multiple debt types, while small unrated firms specialize in fewer types. We suggest several explanations for why debt specialization takes place, and show that firms employing few types of debt have higher bankruptcy costs, are more opaque, and lack access to some segments of the debt markets.

By means of a difference-in-differences approach on the volatility of stock returns (σ-DID), we investigate the effect that hedging has on corporate risk. Examining the relation between hedging and the idiosyncratic variance of stock returns, we show that when new commodity derivatives are introduced in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), firms with exposure to the commodities experience up to a 40% drop in the idiosyncratic variance of stock returns. The effect is persistent over time and it is associated with real effects: firms that hedge more also experience an increase in profit margins, investment, access to credit lines, and a drop in cash holdings. Our results establish a direct link between corporate risk management policies and stock return behavior.

We examine the relation between banks’ liquidity risk and their willingness to supply capital to borrowers under previously committed credit lines. We show that during the collapse of the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in the last quarter of 2007 and the first half of 2008, banks with higher exposure to ABCP conduits renegotiated significantly tougher conditions on the outstanding credit lines offered to borrowers in violation of a covenant. Specifically, we find that borrowers faced higher spreads over the prime rate and LIBOR as well as higher commitment fees on undrawn amounts. Our paper suggests that an increase in lender liquidity risk can bear financial implications for firms that use credit lines as an instrument of liquidity management.

We propose a theory of credit lines provided by banks to firms as a form of monitored liquidity insurance. Bank monitoring and resulting revocations help control illiquidity-seeking behavior of firms insured by credit lines. The cost of credit lines is thus greater for firms with high liquidity risk, which in turn are likely to use cash instead of credit lines. We test this implication for corporate liquidity management by identifying exogenous shocks to liquidity risk of firms in corporate bond and equity markets. Firms experiencing increases in liquidity risk move out of credit lines and into cash holdings.