This paper investigates the relevance of non-traditional activities in the estimation of bank efficiency levels using a sample of 752 publicly quoted commercial banks from 87 countries around the world, allowing comparison of the impact of such activities under different levels of economic development, geographical regions and other country characteristics. We estimate both cost and profit efficiency of banks using a traditional function that considers loans and other earnings assets as the only outputs, and two additional functions to account for non-traditional activities, one with off-balance sheet (OBS) items and the other with non-interest income as an additional output. Controlling for cross-country differences in regulatory and environmental conditions, we find that, on average, cost efficiency increases irrespective of whether we use OBS or non-interest income, although the results for profit efficiency are mixed. Our results also reveal that while the inclusion of non-traditional outputs does not alter the directional impact of environmental variables on bank inefficiency, regulations that restrict bank activities and enhance monitoring and supervision provisions improve both cost and profit efficiency.

We treat the banking system as a traded credit portfolio and calculate systemic risk capital as the amount of capital that insures the portfolio's value against unexpected losses. Using data from the largest global financial institutions, we find evidence of extreme event dependence between banks during the recent financial crisis. Subsequently, we extend the existing Gaussian approach by proposing a model that accounts for the extreme event dependence, and we quantify the level of capital shortfall when this characteristic is ignored. Furthermore, the mark to market valuation approach incorporates the economic loss of credit downgrades into the estimates.

We examine, for the first time in the literature, the impact of social capital on the cost of bank equity worldwide. We reach two interesting conclusions. First, consistent with the view that the social capital of a region can constrain managerial opportunistic behavior, enhance the flow of information, and mitigate moral hazard and agency concerns, we find that banks from countries with higher social capital operate with lower cost of equity. Second, consistent with the view of a substitutional relationship between formal and informal institutions we find that the association of social capital with the cost of bank equity becomes weaker in countries with strong formal institutions. The results hold while controlling for numerous bank-level and country-level characteristics, as well as when we account for endogeneity with the use of an instrumental variables approach.

There exists a lively debate as for the appropriate architecture of the financial supervision regime, with a long list of theoretical advantages and disadvantages associated with each one of its key dimensions. The present study investigates whether and how bank profit efficiency is influenced by the central bank’s involvement in financial supervision, the unification of financial authorities, and the independence of the central bank. The results show that efficiency decreases as the number of the financial sectors that are supervised by the central bank increases. Additionally, banks operating in countries with greater unification of supervisory authorities are less profit efficient. Finally, central bank independence has a negative impact on bank profit efficiency.

This study examines the effect of regulations on European insurers’ profitability and risk-adjusted returns. We find an inverted U-shaped relationship between return on assets and regulations relating to capital adequacy, accounting and auditing requirements, and disclosures to supervisors. In contrast, requirements related to technical provisions have a negative effect on return on assets, and we find no evidence of an association with regulations related to investment and supervisory power. We also find evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between a firm's risk-adjusted rate of return and regulations relating to capital requirements as well as corporate governance and internal control. We observe the opposite in the case of technical provisions. These results are robust to controls for various country-specific attributes such as macroeconomic environment, stock market development, overall quality of institutions, and legal origins.

Over the last fifteen years, many countries introduced reforms into the supervisory architecture of their financial sector. However, there is no evidence on whether specific supervisory arrangements were more successful than others during the crisis. Empirical evidence on the topic is in general scarce and there are reasonable theoretical arguments for and against alternative approaches. Similarly, while the effect of central bank independence on price stability has attracted a lot of attention, our knowledge with regards to its effect on bank soundness remains limited. Using a large sample of commercial banks operating in various countries over the period 2000–2011, this paper investigates whether and how bank soundness is influenced by central bank independence, central bank involvement in prudential regulation, and supervisory unification. We find that central bank independence exercises a positive impact on bank soundness, which in the case of smaller banks is enhanced during the crisis. Supervisory unification and the central bank involvement appear to mitigate the adverse effects of the crisis. The power of the supervisory authorities and bank size also appear to be conditional factors.