Abstract I develop a model revealing the interplay between a stock’s liquidity and the policies and value of the issuing firm. The model shows that bid-ask spreads increase not only the firm’s cost of capital but also the opportunity cost of cash, then lowering cash reserves, increasing liquidation risk, and reducing firm value. These outcomes are stronger when internalized by liquidity providers, simultaneously leading to a wider bid-ask spread. A two-way relation between the firm and the liquidity of its stock arises, implying that shocks arising within the firm or in the stock market have more complex implications than previously understood.

Credit default swaps (CDSs) can create empty creditors who potentially force borrowers into inefficient bankruptcy but also reduce shareholders’ incentives to default strategically. We show theoretically and empirically that the presence and the effects of empty creditors on firm outcomes depend on the distribution of bargaining power among claimholders. If creditors would face powerful shareholders in debt renegotiation, firms are more likely to face the empty creditor problem. The empirical evidence confirms that more CDS insurance is written on firms with strong shareholders and that CDSs increase the bankruptcy risk of these same firms. The ensuing effect on firm value is negative.