We review the flourishing literature on the automobile industry since the seminal work of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), or briefly BLP. Their work provides a structural equilibrium framework that forms a basis for conducting policy counterfactuals in several key areas of interest: competition policy and antitrust, trade policy, and taxation and environmental policy. The demand side of the “BLP framework” is micro-founded and allows for rich consumer heterogeneity to generate flexible substitution patterns between products. The supply side specifies marginal costs and accounts for imperfect competition. Our analysis focuses on two main questions. First, how has the framework been tailored to specific situations and how convincingly has it been evaluated to generate trust in the empirical findings and policy conclusions? Second, what has been learned about policy issues relevant in the automotive industry using the BLP equilibrium framework?

We propose a methodology for estimating the competition effects from entry when firms sell differentiated products. We first derive precise conditions under which Bresnahan and Reiss’s entry threshold ratios (ETRs) can be used to measure competition effects. We then augment the traditional entry model with a revenue equation. This serves to adjust the ETRs by the extent of market expansion from entry, giving unbiased estimates of the competition effects. We apply our approach to seven local service sectors. We find that entry typically leads to significant market expansion, implying that traditional ETRs may substantially underestimate the competition effects from entry.

Using a rich personnel data set of a large European university we find strong evidence for the existence of an internal labor market. First, there is a strong port of entry at the lowest academic rank and in fact even prior to entering professorship, resulting in very long internal careers. Second, wages do not follow external wage developments. We subsequently consider various incentive theories regarding the dynamics of promotions, as organized through annual tournaments. As expected, a rigid set of research and teaching criteria determine the speed of promotions. At the same time, administrative rigidities play an important role.

Exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers and retailers force new entrants to set up their own costly dealer networks to enter the market. We ask whether such contracts may act as an entry barrier, and provide an empirical analysis of the European car market. We first estimate a demand model with product and spatial differentiation, and quantify consumers' valuations for dealer proximity and dealer exclusivity. We then perform policy counterfactuals to assess the profit incentives and possible entry-deterring effects of exclusive dealing. We find that there are no unilateral incentives to maintain exclusive dealing, but there is a collective incentive for the industry as a whole. Furthermore, a ban on exclusive dealing would raise the smaller entrants' market share. But more importantly, consumers would gain, not so much because of increased price competition, but rather because of the increased spatial availability, which compensates for the demand inefficiency from a loss of dealer exclusivity.

We propose a random coefficients nested logit (RCNL) model to compare the tractable nested logit (NL) model with the more complex random coefficients logit (RC) model. After a simulation study, we use data on the European automobile market. Both the NL and RC models are rejected against the RCNL model. The RC model results in different substitution patterns and a wider market definition than the NL and RCNL models. Nevertheless, the predicted price effects from mergers are robust across models. Our findings stress the importance of accounting for discrete sources of market segmentation not captured by continuous product characteristics.