In an article in this Review, Arthur Raviv (1979) examines Pareto optimal insurance policies when an insurer incurs settlement costs C induced by indemnity for loss x. Raviv's main result is that a necessary and sufficient condition for the Pareto optimal deductible to equal zero is C'(I) = 0. This implies that deductible policies give the best tradeoff between risk sharing and economizing on costly claim settlements. Since in practice these costs are significant, the theorem is of considerable importance. Among others, this has been recognized by Robert Townsend (1979), Michael Brennan and Ray Solanki (1981), David Mayers and Clifford Smith (1981), Gur Huberman, Mayers, and Smith (1983), Harris Schlesinger (1981), and Stuart Turnbull (1983). The theorem is correct, but Raviv's proof is not. In this note a corrected proof for the theorem is given. The corrected proof is important in itself because it allows for a generalization to a greater variety of transactions costs than has previously been considered (see my 1984 paper for details). Section I develops the setting for the problem and the notation to be subsequently used. Raviv's error and the corrected proof are presented in Section II.

ABSTRACT If firm performance affects managers' wealth or reputation, preferences of managers dominate firms' financing decisions. When information about real asset investment is symmetric, managers finance exclusively with equity. If managers know more about asset quality than do investors and if managers are sufficiently risk averse, they signal high‐quality projects with debt. Increases in collateral value decrease risky debt use. Increases in interest rates that do not change productive opportunities increase debt use. The explanation for these and further results is based on underpricing of equity and overpricing of debt at the margin.

Auditing is modeled as a monitoring device to moderate information asymmetry between a firm manager and a consumer‐investor in a contingent claims, general equilibrium model of a production economy. The firm manager may bias his report of state realization and returns to security holders. The role of the audit is to probabilistically discover and correct any such bias. Managers, who share in firm value, choose audit intensity in response to market forces. The market solution is characterized by a lack of unanimity between managers and consumer‐investors with respect to audit intensity. This creates a demand by consumer‐investors for Central Authority intervention. Standard setting is, thus, modeled as a response to public demands to remedy perceived shortcomings of a market solution. Some of the consequences of such intervention are examined. Résumé. La vérification représente un mécanisme de surveillance servant à réduire l'asymétrie d'information entre le gestionnaire et l'investisseur‐consommateur, dans le cadre d'un modèle d‘économie de production fondé sur les réclamations éventuelles et Téquilibre général. Le gestionnaire peut “biaiser” le compte rendu des résultats et rendements présenté aux détenteurs de titres. Le rôle de la vérification consiste à découvrir (de façon probabiliste) et corriger toute forme de ce type de biais. Les gestionnaires, partageant dans la valeur de l'entreprise, choisissent l'intensité de la vérification en réaction aux pressions du marché. L'absence de consensus entre les gestionnaires et les consommateurs‐investisseurs quant à l'intensité de la vérification caractérise la solution du marché. Cet état de fait suscite chez les consommateurs‐investisseurs une demande d'intervention de la part d'une “autorité centrale”. La normalisation est dès lors assimilée à une réaction face aux demandes du public pour corriger les carences visibles de la solution du marché. Quelques conséquences d'une telle intervention sont étudiées ici.