This paper studies how the precision of noisy public information that investors receive about the expected aggregate dividend growth rate affects stock market returns. I show that less precise information can increase the risk premium and stock return volatility. The numerical results from my calibrated model also show that noisy information can significantly increase the risk premium and stock return volatility. My finding implies that the presence of noisy information may help explain the large average risk premium and return volatility in the U.S. financial market. In addition, my finding suggests it is optimal for firms to disclose to investors more precise information to reduce the cost of equity capital.

This paper uses a variant of the consumption-based representative agent model in Campbell and Cochrane [Campbell, J.Y., Cochrane, J.H., 1999. By force of habit: Consumption-based explanation of aggregate stock market behavior. Journal of Political Economy 107, 205–251] to study how investors’ time-varying risk aversion affects asset prices. First, we show that a countercyclical variation of risk aversion drives a procyclical conditional risk premium. Second, we show that with a small value for the volatility of the log surplus consumption ratio, a large value of risk aversion may not determine whether the equity premium and the risk-free rate puzzles can be resolved or not. Third, we show that countercyclical risk aversion may not help explain the predictability of long-horizon stock returns, the univariate mean-reversion of stock prices and the “leverage effect” in return volatility.

Empirical support for the hypothesis that closed-end fund discounts are related to overhanging tax liabilities has been mixed. We introduce a new approach to testing this hypothesis by examining changes in discount levels following distributions of dividends and capital gains. Since distributions reduce future shareholder tax liabilities, the tax liability hypothesis implies that closed-end fund discounts should decline following distributions. Focusing on changes in discounts isolates this tax effect by eliminating the impact of other fund-specific factors on discount levels. Our results support the tax liability hypothesis, showing that short-run fluctuations in discounts are directly affected by taxable distributions.