We examine whether attribution bias leads managers who have experienced short-term forecasting success to become overconfident in their ability to forecast future earnings. Importantly, this form of overconfidence is endogenous and dynamic. We also examine the effect of this cognitive bias on the managerial credibility. Consistent with the existence of dynamic overconfidence, managers who have predicted earnings accurately in the previous four quarters are less accurate in their subsequent earnings predictions. These managers also display greater divergence from the analyst consensus and are more precise. Lastly, investors and analysts react less strongly to forecasts issued by overconfident managers.

Following the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, self-regulated peer reviews at accounting firms were replaced by independent inspections conducted by the Public Company Accounting and Oversight Board. Critics of self-regulation had argued that the peer review program lacked credibility. This paper tests whether the opinions issued by the peer reviewers provided credible information to clients about audit firm quality. We find audit firms gained clients after receiving clean opinions from their reviewers and lost clients after receiving modified or adverse opinions. This suggests peer review opinions provided credible information about quality differences between audit firms.

When a firm issues a management forecast, analysts who have observed more forecasts from this firm since covering it (i.e., have more MF-Experience) subsequently improve their own accuracy more and provide timelier earnings forecasts for other (non-issuing) firms in the same industry. We also find that, subsequent to a management forecast, investors are more responsive to forecast revisions for non-issuing firms made by analysts with more MF-Experience. Further tests suggest that our results are not explained by endogeneity in firm coverage. Data Availability: Data are commercially available.

We show empirically that analysts who display more consistent forecast errors have greater ability to affect prices, and that this effect is larger than that of stated accuracy. These results lead to three implications. First, consistent analysts are less likely to be demoted and are more likely to be nominated All Star analysts. Second, analysts strategically deliver downward‐biased forecasts to increase their consistency (if at the expense of stated accuracy). Finally, the benefits of consistency and of “lowballing” (accuracy) are increasing (decreasing) in institutional investors’ presence.

We provide evidence that analyst coverage affects security issuance. First, firms covered by fewer analysts are less likely to issue equity as opposed to debt. They issue equity less frequently, but when they do so, it is in larger amounts. Moreover, these firms depend more on favorable market conditions for their equity issuance decisions. Finally, debt ratios of less covered firms are more affected by Baker and Wurgler's (2002) “external finance‐weighted” average market‐to‐book ratio. These results are consistent with market timing behavior associated with information asymmetry, as well as behavior implied by dynamic adverse selection models of equity issuance.

Human estimation and inference are subject to systematic biases such as overconfidence and over-optimism. In contrast to prior research that has identified multiple negative consequences of these biases, we focus on positive effects. We empirically examine a setting in which over-optimism a) is a related but different bias from overconfidence, b) emerges dynamically in a rational economic framework, and c) generates higher managerial effort. Importantly, this additional effort improves firm profitability and market value.