Many countries have either eliminated or considerably reduced reserve requirements during the last decade. This paper derives the optimal reserve requirements of a simple economy with production and financial intermediation subject to costly state verification, and shows that one motivation for the widely observed reduction in the level of mandatory reserves is linked to the process of financial markets development.

This paper examines the interaction between monetary policy and financial stability and provides an assessment of the implications of banks’ risk management practices for monetary policy. By considering the desire of the central bank to stabilize different types of the “basis” risk as a contribution to financial stability, we derive a set of plausible interest-rate rules characterized by either backward or forward interest-rate smoothing. The paper investigates the determinacy conditions of the rational expectations equilibria obtained under such rules. Contrary to what previously found in the literature, we find that the practice of smoothing interest rates backward does not in general alleviate problems of equilibrium indeterminacy. Moreover, basis risk stabilization may lead to policy rules embedding “forward” interest-rate smoothing, where a new kind of indeterminacy may arise following excessive concern for financial stability.