This is the first study of corporate bond mutual fund performance that examines detailed security-level holdings and returns. The new database allows us to decompose the costs and benefits of active management. In contrast to prior research on equity funds that shows evidence of stock-selection ability, we do not find evidence consistent with bond fund managers, on average, being able to select corporate bonds that outperform other bonds with similar characteristics. We find neutral to weakly positive evidence of ability to time corporate bond characteristics. Overall results show that the costs of active management on average appear larger than the benefits.

Mutual funds that track the S&P 500 are popular because they have significantly lower costs than the average, actively managed equity fund. However, a measurable number of investors select index funds with excessive fees and uncompetitive returns. We call this observation the Index Fund Rationality Paradox because it conflicts with the belief that index fund investors are making a rational, low-cost choice in their ‘type of fund’ decision. In our analysis of this paradox, we find that both retail and institutional index investors tended to make better choices in recent years, but the cost of poor choices among both groups continues to be significant. In fact, we are able to identify an arguably naïve group of retail investors that seem to be unduly influenced by brokers and financial advisors. These investors are largely responsible for the remaining paradox.

Given recent regulatory inquiries into the derivative-trading practices of mutual funds, we examine their detailed option holdings to assess how mutual funds employ options, what funds use options, and how that affects performance and risk. Mutual funds’ use of options appears consistent with income generation and hedging motives, is systematically related to experience, education, and gender characteristics of portfolio managers, and does not lead to performance benefits, on average. Instead, certain uses of options lead to underperformance. We document no permanent or temporary aggressive risk taking by options users, finding instead that some funds use options to effectively lower risk.

We document that speed of information dissemination within mutual fund families positively affects fund performance. This suggests that the resultant benefits of higher information precision far outweigh free-riding costs associated with fast internal dissemination. The performance effect is stronger when information travels across managers from different, rather than the same, styles. This is consistent with fast information diffusion aggregating complementary insights that sharpen information precision, but also with fewer free-riding opportunities among managers from different styles. Managers rationally exploit the resultant higher information precision by trading more, relying less on public information, and investing differently than unaffiliated peers.

The corporate bond market is larger, more illiquid, and presumably less efficient than the equity market. These features provide numerous profit opportunities for corporate bond mutual funds that are unique to the corporate bond market. However, whether corporate bond mutual funds have the valuation skills needed to take advantage of these opportunities is unclear. We introduce a novel measure to assess the valuation skills of investment-grade corporate bond mutual funds, which we refer to as the valuation accuracy score (VAS). VAS recognizes funds holding more underpriced and less overpriced corporate bonds as ex-ante having better valuation skills. It predicts future fund performance, is stable over time, and is unrelated to other sources of skill. Investors chase the performance of higher-VAS funds more aggressively and exhibit a convex flow–performance relation among these funds.

This study examines the performance of mutual funds managed by firms that simultaneously manage hedge funds. We find that the reported returns of mutual funds in these “side-by-side” associations with hedge funds significantly underperformed those of mutual funds that shared similar fund and family characteristics but differed in that they were not affiliated with hedge funds. Digging deeper into performance, we find that the underperformance was confined to return gaps, a return measure that captures the impact of unobservable managerial actions. Interestingly, mutual funds with investment styles that were most closely aligned to affiliated hedge funds generated reported-return alphas and return gaps that underperformed by the greatest amount. Finally, we find that side-by-side mutual funds received less of a contribution to performance from IPO underpricing than similar unaffiliated mutual funds or affiliated hedge funds. Evidence does not support the hypothesis that affiliations with hedge funds allow side-by-side mutual funds to attract superior stock-picking talent. Our evidence does not allow us to rule out the possibility that management firms maximized fee income by strategically transferring performance from mutual funds to hedge funds.

Rationality would suggest that advice-seeking investors receive benefits from costly financial advice. However, evidence documenting these benefits for US investors has so far been lacking. This article is the first to document that US mutual fund investors indeed receive one of the many previously hypothesized benefits associated with financial advice. The documented benefit comes from valuable tax-management advice that helps investors avoid taxable fund distributions and becomes even more valuable when investors face distributions that can cause large and hard-to-predict tax liabilities. Additional evidence suggests that financial advice helps with other aspects of tax management such as tax-loss selling.

We study the dispersion of month-end valuations placed on identical corporate bonds by different mutual funds. Such dispersion is related to bond-specific characteristics associated with liquidity and market volatility. The Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) could have contributed to the general decline in dispersion over our sample period, though other factors most likely played roles. Further tests reveal marking patterns to be consistent with returns smoothing behavior by managers. Funds with ambiguous marking policies and those holding “hard-to-mark” bonds appear more prone to smooth reported returns. From a regulatory perspective, we see little downside to requiring funds to explicitly state their marking standards.

We relate the performance of mutual fund trades to their motivation. A fund manager who buys stocks when there are heavy investor outflows is likely to be motivated by the belief that the stocks are significantly undervalued. In contrast, when there are heavy inflows, the manager is likely to be motivated to work off excess liquidity by buying stocks. Our analysis reveals that managers making purely valuation-motivated purchases substantially beat the market but are unable to do so when compelled to invest excess cash from investor inflows. A similar, but weaker, pattern is found for stocks that are sold.

Human capital acquired while working in other industries before joining fund management provides fund managers with an information advantage. Fund managers exploit this advantage by overweighting their experience industries and by picking outperforming stocks from these industries. These managers’ superior information is impounded into stock prices slowly, suggesting that their information is unique and takes a while to be discovered by the markets. Families exploit their manager’s industry-specific human capital by broadly employing their investment ideas in other funds. The investment value of industry experience is unaffected by whether or not the manager with such experience is in a team. Received August 25, 2016; editorial decision December 24, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.