Aggregation of preferences, 256. — The paradox of voting and its significance, 257. — Voting in a simple model, 258. — Some complications, 260. — Unimportance of the paradox, 263. — Voting in a more realistic model, 264. — Conclusion, 270.

Journal Article The Social Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment: Comment Get access Gordon Tullock Gordon Tullock University of Virginia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 78, Issue 2, May 1964, Pages 331–336, https://doi.org/10.2307/1879332 Published: 01 May 1964

Journal Article Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules: Comment Get access Gordon Tullock Gordon Tullock University of South Carolina Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 75, Issue 3, August 1961, Pages 493–496, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885135 Published: 01 August 1961

The author comments on the article by Stiglitz (Am. Econ. Rev.; 66: 655-661(Sep 1976), especially taking issue with the intuitive model used; the model, a two-period model, uses zero extraction costs and a constant elasticity of demand in appraising the OPEC cartel. He also points to another quite unrealistic assumption, namely: That part of the stock which we do not consume in the first period will be consumed in the second. Pointing out that the constant elasticity assumption is usually used for mathematical convenience - never fits any real world situation - Tullock proceeds to show that not only have the oil-producing countries made a great deal of money from their cartel, but that this is what theory indicates should happen.