As in other countries, Australian accounting for unincorporated joint ventures varies systematically between firms in different phases in the extractive industries (explorer vs. producer). We argue that these differences in accounting method can be explained by differences in the type of assets and the manner in which they are owned and financed. We hypothesize that when unincorporated joint ventures are financed on a with-recourse basis they will be proportionately consolidated; when they are financed on a non-recourse basis one-line reporting is expected. Empirical results are consistent with this hypothesis and appear to generalize to the real estate industry.

A sample of Australian companies entering financial distress is found to have significantly longer reporting delays than a control group of companies. Unfortunately the reporting lags, either alone or in conjunction with conventional bankruptcy prediction models, do not appear to add to our ability to predict distress.

We examine the use of dual class stock in Australian second board firms at the time of going public. This setting provides a more powerful test of claims that departures from the `one-share one-vote' rule are a response to incentive problems created when maximizing firm value requires significant commitments of firm specific human capital. We find, relative to a control group, that dual class firms have a higher proportion of their value determined by the expected realization of growth options rather than assets-in-place. Although our conclusions must be tempered by the qualitative nature of much of the evidence, the value of these growth opportunities appears to be highly dependent on the human capital of the founding shareholders. The absence of substitute governance mechanisms further supports the view that insider control is an efficient organizational arrangement for these firms, as does the absence of longer term differences in performance relative to control firms. While dual class stock clearly entrenches insiders, we identify a variety of mechanisms (contractual, institutional and personal) which help to ensure that if control changes occur then any gains are shared equally by both classes of stockholder.