We examine execution costs for trades in NYSE issues completed on the NYSE, the NASD dealer market, and the regional stock exchanges during 1994. We find that effective bid-ask spreads are only slightly smaller at the NYSE. However, realized bid-ask spreads, which measure market-making revenue net of losses to betterinformed traders but gross of inventory or order-processing costs, are lower on the NYSE by a factor of two to three. This differential is attributable to the successful ‘cream skimming’ of uninformed trades by off-NYSE market makers. These findings reinforce existing concerns about whether orders are routed so as to receive the best possible execution.

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We examine how measures that defend incumbent managers against replacement by rival managers affect the information generated in control contests and how this information is used in subsequent investment decisions. We show that commonly used defensive measures allow shareholders to make better investment decisions than they can make absent these measures. Consequently, the adoption of defensive measures can increase shareholders' wealth. We find that good managers are less defended than poor managers and that managers whose interests are closely aligned with those of shareholders (e.g., via options or bonus plans) are less defended and have more control over firm decisions than managers whose interests are not so well aligned with those of shareholders. We also show that the informational role of defensive measures depends on the relative uncertainty about the quality of both parties to a control contest, and relate the predictions to the empirical evidence in the literature.

This paper establishes a set of conditions for the uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium price in exchange and production economies. Building on the earlier work of J. M. Grandmont and W. Hildenbrand, it shows that increasing heterogeneity in preferences (in some well-defined sense) causes aggregate Engel curves to become increasingly linear. So sufficient dispersion, together with the assumption that preferences and endowments are independently distributed, leads to the aggregate excess demand function satisfying the law of demand. Uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium price follows.

We compare top management turnover in unacquired U.S. industrial companies during an active takeover market (1984–1988) and a less active takeover market (1989–1993). For firms in the lowest quartile of performance (measured by operating income scaled by assets). 33% experience complete turnover of the president, CEO, and board chair during the active takeover period and only 17% experience complete turnover during the less active period. Controlling for various determinants of management turnover, we provide evidence that turnover and performance are related only in the active takeover period, and conclude that takeover activity affects the intensity of managerial discipline.

We exploit a unique experimental setting within the life insurance industry to examine the effects of taxes, regulation, earnings, and organizational form on life insurers' investment portfolio realizations. A unique equity tax levied on mutual life insurers, as well as the statutory rate variation that occurred during our sample period, allow us to disentangle the effects of taxes from earnings or profitability. Consistent with some policymakers' claims, we find mutual insurers' capital gain realizations are affected by company-specific equity tax rate variation. In addition, we find capital regulation and earnings considerations affect both stocks' and mutuals' realizations.

This paper develops asymptotic distribution theory for instrumental variable regression when the partial correlation between the instruments and a single included endogenous variable is weak, here modeled as local to zero. Asymptotic representations are provided for various instrumental variable statistics, including the two-stage least squares (TSLS) and limited information maximum- likelihood (LIML) estimators and their t-statistics. The asymptotic distributions are found to provide good approximations to sampling distributions with just 20 observations per instrument. Even in large samples, TSLS can be badly biased, but LIML is, in many cases, approximately median unbiased. The theory suggests concrete quantitative guidelines for applied work. These guidelines help to interpret Angrist and Krueger's (1991) estimates of the returns to education: whereas TSLS estimates with many instruments approach the OLS estimate of 6%, the more reliable LIML and TSLS estimates with fewer instruments fall between 8% and 10%, with a typical confidence interval of (6%, 14%).

This paper analyzes seven mandated disclosures contained in Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) to assess their information content. Generally, the results show that certain MD&A disclosures, particularly the discussions of future operations and planned capital expenditures, are associated with future (short-term) performance measures and investment decisions, after control- ling for information contained in financial-statement-based ratios. However, the associations with longer-term results are generally not significant. The study illustrates that, in conjunction with the financial statements, the MD&A disclosures, especially prospective disclosures, can assist in assessing firms' future (short-term) prospects.