Over the last three decades, Mexico has aggressively reformed its economy, opening to foreign trade and investment, achieving fiscal discipline, and privatizing state owned enterprises. Despite these efforts, the country's economic growth has been lackluster, trailing that of many other developing nations. In this paper, I review arguments for why Mexico hasn't sustained higher rates of economic growth. The most prominent suggest that some combination of poorly functioning credit markets, distortions in the supply of nontraded inputs, and perverse incentives for informality creates a drag on productivity growth. These are factors internal to Mexico. One possible external factor is that the country has the bad luck of exporting goods that China sells, rather than goods that China buys. I assess evidence from recent literature on these arguments and suggest directions for future research.

Predictions of firm-level credit spreads based on the current spot and forward credit spreads can be significantly improved upon by using the information contained in the shape of the credit-spread curve. However, the current credit-spread curve is not a sufficient statistic for predicting future out-of-sample credit spreads; predictions can be significantly improved upon by exploiting the information contained in the shape of the riskless yield curve. In the presence of credit-spread and riskless factors, other macroeconomic, marketwide, and firm-specific risk variables do not significantly improve predictions of credit spreads. These results have important implications for credit-spreads modeling as well as for better understanding corporate capital structure and risk management policies.

Precautionary saving has been linked to the property of prudence, and the property of temperance has been used to show how the presence of an unavoidable risk affects one's behaviour towards a second risk. These two higher order risk effects also play key roles in aversion to negative skewness and to kurtosis, respectively. This article presents a laboratory experiment to determine whether subjects are prudent and/or temperate. The experiment is based upon preferences over lottery pairs in simple 50–50 gambles. Subjects are asked in which of two states of nature they would prefer to receive a zero-mean gamble. For prudence, the choices are between a lower and higher wealth outcome. For temperance, the choices are between a state with no other risk and a state with a second (independent) risk. The results show behavioural evidence for prudence, but they also show evidence of intemperate behaviour. Implications of these results for both expected-utility and non-expected-utility models are examined.

We analyze the impact of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investments on firm values and provide evidence consistent with the tradeoff between the monitoring and lobbying benefits versus tunneling and expropriation costs of SWFs as blockholders. The data show significant positive (negative) returns to announcements of SWF investments (divestments). The returns are non-monotonic, first rising (falling) and then falling (rising) with the share sought (sold) for investments (divestments). Moreover, we find that SWFs are often active investors. Slightly more than half of the target firms experience one or more events indicative of SWF monitoring activity or influence.

Marriage allows couples to diversify labor income risks and dynamically coordinate labor supply decisions in response to shocks. This paper argues that these risk-sharing benefits of marriage are countercyclical; husbands' and wives' income changes are more positively correlated when the economy is growing rapidly. As a result, while individuals face more idiosyncratic income risk in bad times than in good, households do not. I exploit variation in the cross-sectional covariance of husbands' and wives' incomes to infer the covariance of past income changes. Couples with marriages spanning periods of greater economic expansion have more positively correlated incomes in the cross-section.

Consumption commitments—goods like housing for which adjustment is costly—change the relationship between risk and consumption. Commitment provides a motive to reduce consumption when possible future losses are too small to warrant adjustment but not when losses are large enough that adjustment would be worthwhile. This implies conditions under which mean-preserving increases in risk can increase housing consumption. Our empirical evidence exploits the interaction of these conditions with a novel proxy for unemployment risk: couples sharing an occupation. Consistent with our model, same-occupation couples consume more housing only when adjustment costs are high and potential losses are sufficiently large.