This study empirically examines possible motivational factors leading to reductions in pension plan overfunding. The results indicate that firms with severe financial weakening terminate pension plans. Firms with less severe financial weakening change actuarial assumptions to reduce required cash contributions to pension plans. Although decline in marginal tax rates and increased susceptibility to takeover are positively associated with overfunding reductions, increased financial weakening appears to be the most plausible explanation. The results are consistent with termination of pension plans being a costly source of financing.

Examines possible determinants of firms' decisions to reduce benefits of retiree health care plans. Increasing contracting cost caused by the financial reporting consequences of Statement on Financial Accounting Standards SFAS No. 106; Financial weakness independent of SFAS No. 106; Firm-specific changes in retiree health care costs.

Reviews the book `Special Report--A Report Guide to Implementation of Statement 106 on Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions--Questions and Answers,' by K.E. Dakdduk and Jules M. Cassel.

A recent article in this journal (Hsieh, Ferris, and Chen, 1990) presents evidence demonstrating that financially distressed firms that terminate overfunded pension plans experience significantly positive abnormal returns, while nondistressed terminating firms experience returns not different from zero. The article concludes from this evidence that the market regards the property rights to excess assets as residing fully with the sponsoring firm prior to termination, particularly when the sponsoring firm is not financially distressed. Accordingly, the reporting requirements of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 88, which require immediate recognition of gains resulting from termination, are inconsistent with the market's view of the ownership rights to excess plan assets. Similarly, the article suggests that the excise tax imposed on asset reversions is “punitive” because property rights to fund assets resided with the company prior to termination. This paper questions three aspects of the Hsieh, Ferris, and Chen article: (1) the plausibility of the theory explaining differential reaction to the announcement to terminate for distressed and nondistressed firms; (2) the effect of the distressed/nondistressed classification criteria, event date specification, and event window length on the results; and (3) the appropriateness of using the empirical results, if reliable, to evaluate accounting treatment or federal tax policy. Résumé. Dans un récent article paru dans cette même publication, Hsieh, Ferris et Chen (1990) soumettaient des faits démontrant que les entreprises en difficulté financière qui mettent fin à un régime de retraite surprovisionné enregistrent des rendements anormaux positifs importants, tandis que les entreprises qui mettent fin à un régime de retraite sans être en difficulté financière enregistrent des rendements qui ne sont pas différents de zéro. De là, les auteurs concluaient que le marché estime que les droits à l'excédent d'actif appartiennent exclusivement à l'entreprise responsable du régime avant la cessation, en particulier lorsque cette dernière n'est pas en difficulté financière. Par conséquent, les exigences de la norme SFAS No. 88 en matière d'information à fournir, qui prévoient la constatation immédiate du produit de la cessation du régime, ne sont pas conformes à la façon de voir du marché relativement aux droits à l'excédent d'actif du régime. De la même façon, selon les auteurs, la taxe d'accise imposée en cas de retour de l'actif est “punitive”, étant donné que les droits à l'actif du régime appartenaient à l'entreprise avant la cessation du régime. Les auteurs s'interrogent ici sur trois aspects de l'article de Hsieh, Ferris, et Chen: 1) la pertinence de la théorie expliquant la réaction marginale à l'annonce de la cessation d'un régime pour les entreprise qui sont en difficulté financière et celles qui ne le sont pas; 2) l'incidence sur les résultats des critères permettant de classer les entreprises comme étant en difficulté financière ou ne l‘étant pas, de la précision de la date de l’événement et de la longueur de la période pré‐post relative à l‘événement; et 3) l'opportunité de l'utilisation des résultats empiriques, s'ils sont fiables, pour évaluer le traitement comptable ou la politique fiscale fédérale.

Analyzes stock returns associated with the announcement to terminate overfunded defined-benefit pension plans. Evaluation of the use of the reversion amount as a measure of wealth transfer from plan participants to shareholders; Resolution of inconsistencies across prior studies regarding the existence of a significant positive market reaction at the termination announcement.

This paper examines a fundamental question of interest to researchers and regulators: Does the market treat disclosed financial statement information as if it is less reliable than information recognized in the body of the financial statements? Specifically, we compare the perceived reliability of liabilities for retiree benefits other than pensions (PRBs) disclosed prior to adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 106 (SFAS No. 106) with the perceived reliability of PRB liabilities subsequently recognized under SFAS No. 106. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the market treating disclosed PRB liabilities as less reliable than recognized PRB liabilities and pension liabilities. However, once PRB liabilities are recognized, they do not appear to be any less reliable than pension liabilities. These findings are inconsistent with the Choi, Collins, and Johnson 1997 conclusion that PRB liabilities are inherently less reliable than pension liabilities. The paper also investigates factors that may have contributed to the lower perceived disclosure reliability. Our results suggest that the market perceived PRB liability disclosures to be less reliable when firms provided range disclosures, had higher probabilities of reducing plan benefits, or had lower ratios of retiree to total PRB obligations. These findings suggest that reliability may have been enhanced if more supporting details had been provided in Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 74 disclosures.

This study examines whether the market values financial statement data differently if it is disclosed instead of recognized in the body of the financial statements. We identify a sample of 229 SFAS No. 106 adopters who disclose an estimate of their anticipated liability for retiree benefits other than pensions (PRB) in their financial reports prior to the year of recognition. We then test whether the disclosed estimate of the PRB liability is valued differently by the market than is the subsequently recognized PRB liability. We provide modest and model-sensitive evidence that the recognized PRB liability receives more weight than the disclosed liability in market value association tests.