We examine the effect of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions on non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Prior literature documents that voluntary clawback adoption improves financial reporting quality by increasing the costs of misstating GAAP earnings. However, managers may respond to perceptions of reduced discretion over GAAP reporting by increasing their reliance on non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Using a propensity score matched sample, we find that non-GAAP earnings disclosure frequency increases and non-GAAP exclusion quality decreases after clawback adoption, consistent with a more opportunistic use of non-GAAP reporting. Additional cross-sectional tests help support this interpretation.

This study examines the informational value of local news outlets and how they affect insider trading. We hypothesize that local news coverage is a critical channel through which outsiders acquire local information, which restricts insiders’ ability to profit from their information advantage. We argue that a loss of local news coverage increases information opacity faced by outsiders, while making it easier for insiders to seize profitable trading opportunities. Exploring the staggered shutdown of local newspapers, our difference-in-differences estimation presents novel evidence that insiders from closure counties trade more profitably after local newspaper closures, particularly in small firms that lack alternative news sources. Further analyses reaffirm that the post-closure increase in trading profits is unlikely to be wholly driven by regional economic conditions and is likely driven by increased information costs. Our results highlight that local newspapers play a meaningful role in mitigating information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from the sources identified in the paper.

This paper examines the relation between the dispersion in pay‐performance sensitivities (PPS) among top management team (TMT) members and earnings quality. Prior research suggests that the PPS from executives' equity compensation induce earnings manipulation incentives. Most of this research, however, focuses on the PPS of individual executives, even though the financial reporting process requires the coordination among a broad range of executives. Focusing on the dispersion in PPS among TMTs, we develop a model that shows that, due to the coordination incentives embedded in compensation arrangements, managers with more closely aligned PPS will be more willing to work together to manipulate earnings as the rewards are shared more evenly among them. We empirically test the implications from our model and find a positive relation between PPS dispersion and earnings quality. We further find that the stock price reaction to firms' reported earnings relates to the earnings manipulation incentives based on PPS dispersion. Our results suggest that differences in PPS among TMT members hamper the coordination necessary to manipulate earnings and that investors are aware of this impact. Our study has important implications related to compensation‐related disclosures (e.g., those under section 953a of the Dodd‐Frank Act of 2010) and their potential impact on investors' understanding of earnings quality.