We propose a term structure model featuring double-autoregressive dynamics, which can accommodate unit roots and cointegrating relations while maintaining stationarity. In an empirical application, the model reduces in-sample misspecification and significantly improves out-of-sample yield forecasts compared with term structure models based on linear VAR dynamics. The double-autoregressive process implies term premia that resemble the term spread. We test whether these premia help in overcoming the persistence problem of stationary VAR models with mixed results. Finally, we discuss alternative interpretations of the mechanism inducing stationarity in our model.

Our study is motivated by the theory of credence goods in the auditing setting. We propose that audit committee accounting expertise should reduce information asymmetries between the auditor and the client, thereby limiting auditors' ability to over-audit and under-audit. Consistent with this notion, our results indicate that when audit committees have accounting expertise, clients (1) pay lower fees when changes in standards decrease required audit effort; (2) pay a smaller fee premium in the presence of remediated material weaknesses; and (3) have a reduced likelihood of restatement when audit market competition is high. Our findings in the under-auditing setting generally are strongest among non-Big 4 engagements, consistent with non-Big 4 auditors being less sensitive to market-wide disciplining mechanisms such as reputation, legal liability, and professional regulation. We also provide evidence that the nature of audit committee members' accounting expertise differentially impacts the committee's ability to curtail over- and under-auditing.