Data are used from the 1984–2016 Displaced Workers Surveys (DWS) to investigate the incidence and consequences of job loss, 1981–2015. These data show a record high rate of job loss in the Great Recession, with serious employment consequences for job losers, including very low rates of re-employment and difficulty finding full-time employment. The average reduction in weekly earnings for job losers making a full-time–full-time transition are relatively small, with a substantial minority reporting earning more on their new job than on the lost job. Most of the cost of job loss comes from difficulty finding new full-time employment.

I examine the extent to which workers who lose jobs obtain work in alternative employment arrangements, including temporary work and independent contracting, and obtain voluntary or involuntary part‐time work. I find that job losers are significantly more likely than nonlosers to be in both temporary jobs (including on‐call work and contract work) and involuntarily part‐time jobs. I also find evidence that temporary and involuntary part‐time jobs are part of a transitional process subsequent to job loss leading to regular full‐time employment.

I use a large sample of jobs from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to examine job mobility patterns and to evaluate theories of interfirm worker mobility There are three main findings. First, the monthly hazard of job ending is not monotonically decreasing in tenure as most earlier work using annual data has found, but it increases to a maximum at 3 months and declines thereafter. Second, mobility is strongly positively related to the frequency of job change prior to the start of the job. Finally, job change in the most recent year prior to the start of the job is more strongly related than earlier job change to mobility on the current job.

The dramatic decline in unionization over the last decade is investigated in the context of a supply/demand model of union status determination using data from surveys of workers conducted in 1977 and 1984 along with data from the National Labor Relations Board on representation elections. It is concluded that the decline in unionization since 1977 is accounted for largely by (1) an increase in employer resistance to unionization, probably due to increased product market competitiveness and (2) a decrease in demand for union representation by nonunion workers due to an increase in the satisfaction of nonunion workers with their jobs and a decline in nonunion workers' beliefs that unions are able to improve wages and working conditions.

It is a well-known fact that the extent of unionization is less in states with right-to-work (RTW) laws. A framework is developed for determining whether RTW laws actually cause a decrease in the extent of unionization or whether they simply mirror preexisting tastes of workers against unions. A set of empirical tests is proposed that can distinguish between these explanations based on differences between RTW and non-RTW states in the demand for union representation, the supply of union jobs relative to that demand, and the observed union/nonunion wage differential. These tests are implemented using disaggregated data from the Quality of Employment Survey and the Current Population Survey, and a pattern is found that is consistent with the hypothesis that RTW laws simply mirror preexisting preferences against union representation.

I replicate and extend the seminal work of Camerer et al. (“Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 [1997], 407–441), who find that the wage elasticity of daily hours of work for New York City taxi drivers is negative and conclude that their labor supply behavior is consistent with reference dependence. In contrast, my analysis of the complete record of all trips taken in NYC taxi cabs from 2009 to 2013 shows that drivers tend to respond positively to unanticipated as well as anticipated increases in earnings opportunities. Additionally, using a discrete choice stopping model, the probability of a shift ending is strongly positively related to hours worked but at best weakly related to income earned. I find substantial heterogeneity across drivers in their elasticities, but the estimated elasticities are generally positive and rarely substantially negative. I find that new drivers with smaller elasticities are more likely to exit the industry, whereas drivers who remain quickly learn to be better optimizers (have positive labor supply elasticities that grow with experience). These results are consistent with the neoclassical optimizing model of labor supply and suggest that consideration of gain-loss utility and income reference dependence is not an important factor in the daily labor supply decisions of taxi drivers.

The labor market in the Great Recession and its aftermath is characterized by great difficulty in escaping unemployment. I present two empirical analyses of a particular explanation for that difficulty, that the housing market crisis has prevented the unemployed from selling their homes and moving to take new jobs. First, I examine post-job-loss mobility rates by home ownership status using data from the Displaced Workers Survey. Second, I examine mobility rates for unemployed homeowners and renters from the month-to-month CPS match. Neither analysis provides any support for the idea that the housing market crisis has reduced mobility of the unemployed.

I develop a model of daily labor supply where preferences are dependent on a reference daily income level, and I apply this model to data on the labor supply of New York City taxi drivers. I find that there may be a reference level of income on a given day that affects labor supply. However, there is substantial day-to-day variation in a given driver's reference level, and most shifts end before reaching the reference income level. This pattern is inconsistent with an important role for reference-dependent preferences.

this paper contains the development of the model to be tested, while Section II provides an interpretation of the model and spells out the testing framework. Section III contains a description of the sample, while Section IV contains the empirical results and an example of their use in analyzing a particular bargaining situation. Section V provides a summary of the results, a discussion of some of their limitations, and suggestions for further research

The labor supply of taxi drivers is consistent with the existence of intertemporal substitution. My analysis of the stopping behavior of New York City cabdrivers shows that daily income effects are small and that the decision to stop work at a particular point on a given day is primarily related to cumulative daily hours to that point. This is in contrast to the analysis of Camerer et al., who find that the daily wage elasticity of labor supply of New York City cabdrivers is substantially negative, implying large daily income effects. This difference in find-ings is due to important differences in empirical methods and to problems with the conception and measurement of the daily wage rate used by Camerer et al. I.