This paper studies the price reaction of French common stocks to the recent nationalization program and estimates the value that nationalized firms would have had if the nationalization program had not occurred. It finds that expropriated holders of the nationalized portfolio received a government-legislated takeover premium of about 20 percent. Premiums received for individual firms ranged from —3 to 44 percent. Industrial firm shareholders benefited most from the program. The conditions surrounding the premium dispersion raise questions about equal treatment among expropriated shareholders.

In 1970, France introduced disclosure rules governing public tender offers without changing an existing four-week minimum offer period. We document a substantial increase in total offer premiums thereafter. Post-1970 premiums are also significantly higher in public than in private tender offers, where information disclosure is not required, and in all-cash than in all-stock offers. The impact of the payment method is evident in minority buyouts as well as in offers for voting control. The component of the total premium reflecting the value of the option to tender appears to be unaffected by either disclosure regulations or the payment method.