This paper explains the rationale behind deposit collateral that has not been discussed in the literature on financial contracting. In our model extending Hart and Moore (1998) to account for liquidity shocks, deposit collateral has potentially two important effects: the enhancement of pledgeability and the provision of liquidity. We show that only if liquidity shocks are stochastic, both effects are significant and overall efficiency is improved. This improvement is the raison d'être of deposit collateral. The result also establishes a unique role for banks, since deposit collateral can only be taken by these financial institutions. Furthermore, it is shown that the collateral can be implemented in the form of compensating balance requirements with or without commitment loans and is attached with less restrictive efficiency conditions than alternative lending arrangements.

This paper investigates whether competition in the Japanese banking sector has improved in the last quarter of the 20th century. By estimating the first order condition of profit maximization, together with the cost function and the inverse demand function, we found that competition had improved, especially in the 1970s and in the first half of the 1980s. The results fail to reject a Cournot oligopoly for city banks for most of the period, while they do reject it for regional banks for the overall period. This suggests that competition among city banks was stronger than that among regional banks.

This paper investigates whether Japanese banks had been following herd behavior in the domestic loan market from 1975 through 2000. Applying the technique developed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny [Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.V., 1992. The impact of institutional trading on stock prices, J. Finan. Econ. 32, 23–43] to the data from loans outstanding to different types of borrowers, we obtain evidence indicative of the existence of herding. City banks in Japan had been following a cyclical pattern of herding with one of the peaks around the bubble period in the late 1980s. Adjusting further for herding resulting from rational behavior, evidence indicative of the existence of irrational herding was observed only in the bubble period. Our estimate indicates that a total of some 5 trillion yen of loan increase by city banks during the period of 1987–1989 can be attributed to irrational herd behavior. The results imply that irrational bank behavior in the late 1980s might have contributed to the problems Japanese banks had with non-performing loans. We also obtained evidence for herding among regional banks and among geographically proximate banks.

Previous research suggests that loan officers may play a critical role in relationship lending by producing soft information about SMEs. For the first time, we analyze this hypothesis and find empirical evidence that indicates that loan officer activities are associated with bank production of soft information. We also find that loan officers at small banks produce more soft information than at large banks, but large banks appear to have the equivalent potential to underwrite relationship loans. Nevertheless, large banks choose instead to focus their resources on transactions lending.