ABSTRACT In many scenarios such as banking and liquidity crises, inefficiencies often arise because investors face uncertainties about economic fundamentals and the strategies of other investors. How information affects fundamental uncertainty is well studied, but how information affects strategic uncertainty is underexplored. This paper examines how two communication mechanisms, market and cheap talk, affect investment decisions and efficiency in an experimental investment game with both fundamental and strategic uncertainty. I find that the market does not improve coordination because the expectation that coordination failures will occur is self‐fulfilling, while cheap talk improves coordination because the signals of willingness to invest alleviate strategic uncertainty.

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the ex ante effects of public information quality on market prices and how such effects vary with information asymmetry among traders in a two-period experimental market. We vary public information quality by changing its precision and information asymmetry among traders by varying the distribution of private signals. We find high-quality public disclosure leads to increased price efficiency and decreased cost of capital in the pre-announcement period when information asymmetry is high. The impending high-quality public information increases the competition among informed traders, which leads prices to impound more private information and alleviates the adverse selection problems facing uninformed traders. Our study suggests building a high-quality public information environment (e.g., by adopting high-quality accounting standards or committing to transparent disclosure policies) would likely provide ex ante benefits for firms with significant adverse selection among traders.

ABSTRACT When information asymmetry is a major market friction, earnings forecasts can lead to higher price efficiency even after the information in forecasts completely dissipates upon earnings realizations. We show this in an experimental market that features information asymmetry (i.e., some traders possess differential private information). Earnings forecasts reduce information asymmetry and lead to prices that reflect a greater amount of private information. Traders can learn more about others' information from prices. This information learned from past prices continues to reduce information asymmetry and improve price efficiency even after earnings realizations. We contribute to the disclosure literature by showing the evidence that the learning‐from‐price effect amplifies the impact of public disclosure on price efficiency.