Abstract We analyze fund managers’ reputation concerns in an equilibrium model, in which we tie together a number of seemingly unrelated phenomena. The model shows that because of reputation concerns, hedge fund managers, especially those with an average reputation, prefer strategies with negatively skewed return distributions. One subtle consequence of this preference is that capital sometimes appears slow moving, leaving profitable investment opportunities unexploited, yet other times appears fast moving, causing large capital relocation and price fluctuations in the absence of fundamental news. More broadly, the analysis demonstrates a limitation of market discipline: fund managers may distort their investments precisely because of market discipline.

This article analyses the implications of money illusion for investor behaviour and asset prices in a securities market economy with inflationary fluctuations. We provide a belief-based formulation of money illusion which accounts for the systematic mistakes in evaluating real and nominal quantities. The impact of money illusion on security prices and their dynamics is demonstrated to be considerable even though its welfare cost on investors is small in typical environments. A money-illusioned investor's real consumption is shown to generally depend on the price level, and specifically to decrease in the price level. A general-equilibrium analysis in the presence of money illusion generates implications that are consistent with several empirical regularities. In particular, the real bond yields and dividend price ratios are positively related to expected inflation, the real short rate is negatively correlated with realized inflation, and money illusion may induce predictability and excess volatility in stock returns. The basic analysis is generalized to incorporate heterogeneous investors with differing degrees of illusion.

Collateral frictions have a profound effect on our economic landscape, ranging from the design of financial securities, laws, and institutions, to various rules and regulations. We analyze a model with disagreement, where securities and collateral requirements are endogenous. It shows that the security that isolates the variable with disagreement is “optimal” in the sense that alternative securities cannot generate any trading. In an economy with N states, investors may introduce more than N securities, and markets are still incomplete. The model has several novel predictions on the behavior of basis—the spread between the prices of an asset and its replicating portfolio.

We show that Treasury security prices in the secondary market decrease significantly in the few days before Treasury auctions and recover shortly thereafter, even though the time and amount of each auction are announced in advance. These results are linked to dealers' limited risk-bearing capacity and end-investors' imperfect capital mobility, highlighting the important role of frictions even in very liquid financial markets. Our results imply a hidden issuance cost to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, estimated to be 9 to 18 bps of the auction size, or over half a billion dollars for the issuance size in 2007.

Stock market trading restrictions affect prices and liquidity directly through constraints on investors' transactions and indirectly by altering the information environment. We isolate this indirect effect by analyzing how stock market restrictions affect corporate bond yields. Exploiting the staggered reductions of trading restrictions in the Chinese stock market as a quasi-natural experiment, we document that the easing of trading restrictions on a firm's stock decreases its corporate bond spreads. This effect is stronger for firms with less transparency or lower credit ratings. Our evidence suggests that the effect is likely due to improved stock price informativeness.

The sovereign CDS market has developed rapidly for two decades and currently has a gross notional amount of more than a trillion dollars. We document a strong momentum effect in this market, which cannot be explained by a large set of risk factors. These momentum returns are positively skewed and higher during recessions. Consistent with the interpretation that this momentum effect is due to investors’ initial underreaction to sovereign credit information followed by corrections, our evidence shows that the momentum returns tend to be higher during the months surrounding announcements of credit rating or outlook changes of the underlying countries.

We use the advent of new credit default swap (CDS) trading conventions in April 2009—the CDS Big Bang—to study how a shock to funding liquidity impacts market liquidity. After the Big Bang, traders are required to pay upfront fees to execute CDS transactions, with the size of the fees depending on the level of CDS spreads. While CDS bid-ask spreads decline in aggregate after the Big Bang, they do so less for contracts that require larger fees. Furthermore, the funding effect is stronger for smaller and riskier firms and for noncentrally cleared contracts. The effect also becomes stronger after Deutsche Bank's exit.

Abstract Using data from a major online peer-to-peer lending platform, we document that, due to time pressure, investors appear to focus on interest rates and only partially account for credit ratings in their decisions. The effect is stronger for mobile-based investors than for PC-based ones. Our evidence suggests that this variation is caused by the difference in information content on the interfaces rather than differences in the devices’ physical attributes per se. Investors improve their decisions by slowing down and paying more attention to credit ratings after experiencing a loan default firsthand, but not after observing others experiencing defaults.