Valuation risk of a security—uncertainty about its fair value—is a subject of considerable concern in the mutual fund industry. If funds report different values for identical securities, investors cannot easily compare their performance. Yet it is not unusual to see identical illiquid stocks, small-cap stocks, stocks with high analyst dispersion, stocks with less analyst coverage, and newly listed stocks valued differently across mutual funds. An equity fund that has positive price dispersion in its portfolio holdings, that performs poorly, that belongs to a fund family with an inclination for aggressive reporting, that holds more stocks subject to stale prices, that holds more pre-IPO firms, or that experiences net outflows will tend to show positive price dispersion again in the next quarter. This behavior is significant in a volatile market. Aggressive reporting helps funds gain in the mutual fund tournament.

Hsiu-Lang Chen, Narasimhan Jegadeesh, Russ Wermers, The Value of Active Mutual Fund Management: An Examination of the Stockholdings and Trades of Fund Managers, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Sep., 2000), pp. 343-368

Most mutual funds adopt investment styles that cluster around a broad market benchmark. Few funds take extreme positions away from the index, but those who do are more likely to favor growth stocks and past winners. The bias toward glamour and the tendency of poorly performing value funds to shift styles may reflect agency and behavioral considerations. After adjusting for style, there is evidence that growth managers on average outperform value managers. Though a fund’s factor loadings and its portfolio characteristics generally yield similar conclusions about its style, an approach using portfolio characteristics predicts fund returns better.

Recent empirical studies of mutual fund competition examine the relation between a fund’s performance, the fund manager’s compensation, and the fund manager’s choice of portfolio risk. This paper models a manager’s portfolio choice for compensation rules that can be either a concave, linear, or convex function of the fund’s performance relative to that of a benchmark. For particular compensation structures, a manager increases the fund’s “tracking error” volatility as its relative performance declines. However, declining performance does not necessarily lead the manager to raise the volatility of the fund’s return. The paper presents nonparametric and parametric tests of the relation between mutual fund performance and risk taking for more than 6,000 equity mutual funds over the 1962 to 2006 period. There is a tendency for mutual funds to increase the standard deviation of tracking errors, but not the standard deviation of returns, as their performance declines. This risk-shifting behavior appears more common for funds whose managers have longer tenures.