I solve in closed form for the optimal dynamic risk choice of a fund manager who is compensated with a high-water mark contract. The optimal risk choice depends on the ratio of the fund's assets under management to its high-water mark. If the manager's outside option value is low, investors' termination policy is strict, or management fees are high, then negative returns induce the manager into “derisking.” Otherwise, he engages in “gambling.” Having the option to walk away increases risk taking, though in many cases exercise is never optimal. In particular, leaving to restart at a proportionally smaller fund is always suboptimal.

I construct an equilibrium model that captures salient properties of index option prices, equity returns, variance, and the risk‐free rate. A representative investor makes consumption and portfolio choice decisions that are robust to his uncertainty about the true economic model. He pays a large premium for index options because they hedge important model misspecification concerns, particularly concerning jump shocks to cash flow growth and volatility. A calibration shows that empirically consistent fundamentals and reasonable model uncertainty explain option prices and the variance premium. Time variation in uncertainty generates variance premium fluctuations, helping explain their power to predict stock returns.

Uncertainty plays a key role in economics, finance, and decision sciences. Financial markets, in particular derivative markets, provide fertile ground for understanding how perceptions of economic uncertainty and cash-flow risk manifest themselves in asset prices. We demonstrate that the variance premium, defined as the difference between the squared VIX index and expected realized variance, captures attitudes toward uncertainty. We show conditions under which the variance premium displays significant time variation and return predictability. A calibrated, generalized long-run risks model generates a variance premium with time variation and return predictability that is consistent with the data, while simultaneously matching the levels and volatilities of the market return and risk-free rate. Our evidence indicates an important role for transient non-Gaussian shocks to fundamentals that affect agents' views of economic uncertainty and prices.

Between 2003 and 2006, the Federal Reserve raised rates by 4.25%. Yet it was precisely during this period that the housing boom accelerated, fueled by rapid growth in mortgage lending. There is deep disagreement about how, or even if, monetary policy impacted the boom. Using differences in exposure to the deposits channel of monetary policy, we show that Fed tightening induced a large reduction in banks’ deposit funding, which led banks to contract portfolio mortgage lending by 32%. However, this contraction was largely offset by substitution to privately-securitized (PLS) mortgages, led by nonbank originators. Fed tightening thus induced a shift in mortgage lending away from stable, insured deposit funding toward run-prone and fragile capital markets funding with little impact on overall lending. We find similar results during the most recent tightening cycle over 2014–2017 when PLS lending reemerged.

We present a new channel for the transmission of monetary policy, the deposits channel. We show that when the Fed funds rate rises, banks widen the spreads they charge on deposits, and deposits flow out of the banking system. We present a model where this is due to market power in deposit markets. Consistent with the market power mechanism, deposit spreads increase more and deposits flow out more in concentrated markets. This is true even when we control for lending opportunities by only comparing different branches of the same bank. Since deposits are the main source of liquid assets for households, the deposits channel can explain the observed strong relationship between the liquidity premium and the Fed funds rate. Since deposits are also a uniquely stable funding source for banks, the deposits channel impacts bank lending. When the Fed funds rate rises, banks that raise deposits in concentrated markets contract their lending by more than other banks. Our estimates imply that the deposits channel can account for the entire transmission of monetary policy through bank balance sheets.

We model a loop between sovereign and bank credit risk. A distressed financial sector induces government bailouts, whose cost increases sovereign credit risk. Increased sovereign credit risk in turn weakens the financial sector by eroding the value of its government guarantees and bond holdings. Using credit default swap (CDS) rates on European sovereigns and banks, we show that bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk in 2008. We document that post‐bailout changes in sovereign CDS explain changes in bank CDS even after controlling for aggregate and bank‐level determinants of credit spreads, confirming the sovereign‐bank loop.

We analyze lender of last resort (LOLR) lending during the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a novel data set on all central bank lending and collateral, we show that weakly capitalized banks took out more LOLR loans and used riskier collateral than strongly capitalized banks. We also find that weakly capitalized banks used LOLR loans to buy risky assets such as distressed sovereign debt. This resulted in a reallocation of risky assets from strongly to weakly capitalized banks. Our findings cannot be explained by classical LOLR theory. Rather, they point to risk taking by banks, both independently and with the encouragement of governments, and highlight the benefit of unifying LOLR lending and bank supervision.