I use panel data to examine whether long‐term changes in industry wages are positively related to long‐term changes in industry employment. Previous research using repeated cross‐sectional data found no systematic relationship between these variables. Using standard fixed effects models to deal with individual heterogeneity, I find a robust positive relationship between changes in composition‐constant industry wages and industry employment. This suggests that growing industries attract less skilled individuals in a manner that biases down the estimated relationship between industry employment and wages in repeated cross‐sectional data. The results imply that supply curves facing industries are elastic but upward sloping.
In certain industries, sales agent contracts include provisions for sales commissions and clawbacks of commissions if clients are not retained. We show that contracts with these features arise in environments having up‐front selling costs recouped from ongoing sales; heterogeneous customers; limited agent access to capital markets; and imperfect commitment to long‐term contracts. We test the model using information on insurance sales agent contracts from New Zealand prior to and after bank entry into insurance sales. The evidence indicates that banks cream‐skimmed customers. We predict that this should reduce the values of sales commissions and clawbacks. The data support this prediction.
Using data from the 1998 proxy season, we find that higher levels of potential dilution from management-sponsored, executive-only stock option plans result in significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns in the 3-day period surrounding the proxy date. We also present evidence of a significantly negative relationship between the percentage vote against the option proposal and the percentage change in executive pay from the 1998 to 1999 compensation years. We interpret this finding to support the idea that boards of directors are responsive to shareholder concerns about CEO option awards following a high level of shareholder opposition.
The nonlinear relationship between corporate value and managerial ownership is well documented. This has been attributed to the onset of managerial entrenchment, which results in a decrease of corporate value for increasing levels of managerial holdings. We propose a new structure for this relationship that accounts for the effect of conflicting managerial incentives, and external and internal disciplinary monitoring mechanisms. Using this specification as the basis for our analysis, we provide evidence that the managerial ownership–corporate value relationship is co-deterministic. This finding is at odds with recent work which reports that corporate value determines managerial ownership but not vice-versa.
Prior research has argued that convertible preferred equity is the optimal form of venture capital (VC) finance, based on datasets with up to 213 observations from the United States, where unique tax biases exist in favor of convertible preferred. This paper introduces a comparable sample of 3083 Canadian corporate and limited partnership venture financing transactions spanning the years 1991–2000. The data indicate that a variety of securities are used, and convertible preferred equity has not been the most frequent. Empirical tests offer strong support for the proposition that the mix of financing instruments minimizes the costs arising from a set of agency problems.
We estimate the incentive effects of income taxation in a life‐cycle model of consumption and labor supply without intratemporal strong separability. We find that consumption and hours worked are direct complements in utility; both increase with a compensated increase in the net wage. The compensated net wage elasticity is about 0.3, nearly double estimates for U.S. men from a linear labor supply specification. Estimated intertemporal elasticities indicate significant intertemporal smoothing of utility. The estimated marginal welfare cost of government revenue is 6%–20%, which is about half the estimated welfare cost when additivity between consumption and leisure is incorrectly imposed.
Haugen and Baker (1996) report that a long-short stock selection strategy based on more than 50 measures of accounting information and past return behavior would have generated excess returns of approximately 3% per month. We find that the Haugen and Baker strategies do not provide attractive returns after transaction costs if an investor already has access to strategy portfolios based on book-to-market and momentum. We also provide an extensive analysis of transaction costs over a long sample and we report results of independent interest to researchers in market microstructure.