Previous studies provide evidence of a negative relationship between staggered boards and firm value. However, these studies use specifications that do not allow for the heterogeneous impacts of staggered boards for different subsets of firms as predicted by theory. This paper presents more detailed hypotheses regarding how the impact of staggered boards should vary with the probability of takeover. Empirical findings using outside ownership concentration as a proxy for that probability confirm predictions that while for most firms staggered boards do have a negative impact on firm value, for a substantial and identifiable subset of firms staggered boards appear benign.

Financial intermediaries often use stress testing to set risk exposure limits. Accordingly, we examine a model with an agent who faces stress testing constraints and another who does not. Three results are obtained. First, when there are K* binding constraints, the constrained agent's optimal portfolio exhibits (K*+2)-fund separation. Second, the effect of the constraints on the optimal portfolio is identical to that of an adjustment in the expected payoffs of the risky securities that tends to lower them. Third, a security's equilibrium expected return depends on both its systematic risk and its idiosyncratic returns in the states where the constraints bind.

We examine capital expenditures in multi-segment firms before and after the “perfect storm” that affected pension plans between 2000 and 2002, when bond yields and stock prices both fell precipitously. Our sample of firms went from having overfunded to underfunded pension plans as a result of the storm. We examine the segment-level relation between investment, Tobin's q, and cash flow both before and after the event. We find mixed evidence on the change in the relation between investment and q, which may be a result of measurement error in q. We find stronger evidence for the conclusion that after the pension storm, firms with underfunded pension plans directed more investment towards segments that produce higher cash flow.

What are the challenges that globalization makes on welfare states and how should welfare states respond? How should welfare states be designed to enable countries to reap the benefits of globalization? These are the main themes of Hans-Werner Sinn's book, Can Germany Be Saved? We view Germany as a case study of how a welfare state can go wrong in reacting to the pressures of globalization. We present two views of globalization—the “specialization view” (of Sinn) and the “Great Reorganization view” (ours)—and examine the policy implications of each for the welfare state design.