The Great Recession focused attention on large financial institutions and systemic risk. We investigate whether large size provides any cost advantages to the economy and, if so, whether these cost advantages are due to technological scale economies or too-big-to-fail subsidies. Estimating scale economies is made more complex by risk-taking. Better diversification resulting from larger scale generates scale economies but also incentives to take more risk. When this additional risk-taking adds to cost, it can obscure the underlying scale economies and engender misleading econometric estimates of them. Using data pre- and post-crisis, we estimate scale economies using two production models. The standard model ignores endogenous risk-taking and finds little evidence of scale economies. The model accounting for managerial risk preferences and endogenous risk-taking finds large scale economies, which are not driven by too-big-to-fail considerations. We evaluate the costs and competitive implications of breaking up the largest banks into smaller banks.

During the late 1990s, the SEC alleged that banks were overstating loan loss allowances to establish cookie jar reserves. Their intervention in bank accounting culminated in 2001 with new guidance (SAB 102) designed to improve financial reporting quality. We show that banks' allowance estimation changed in response to the SEC's intervention. While allowance informativeness (as proxied by the ability to explain future losses) improved for Strong Banks, informativeness declined for Weak Banks whose incentives are to understate allowances. Our results help to explain why some (Weak) banks delayed loss recognition during the recent financial crisis.

Teacher compensation schemes are often criticized for lacking a performance-based component. Proponents argue that teacher incentive pay can raise student achievement and stimulate system-wide innovation. We examine a group-based teacher incentive scheme implemented in New York City and investigate whether specific features of the program contributed to its ineffectiveness. Although overall the program had little effect on student achievement, we show that in schools where incentives to free ride were weakest, the program led to small increases in math achievement. Our results underscore the importance of carefully considering the design of teacher incentive pay programs.

Material adverse change (MAC) clauses are a ubiquitous feature of acquisitions and exhibit substantial cross-sectional variation in the number and types of events that are excluded from being material adverse events (MAEs). MAEs are the underlying cause of 69% ofacquisition terminations and 80% of renegotiations. These renegotiations lead to substantial changes in the price offered to target shareholders. Acquisitions with fewer MAE exclusions are characterized by wider arbitrage spreads during the acquisition period and are associated with higher offer premiums. We conclude that MAC clauses have an economically important impact on the dynamics of corporate acquisitions.

The use of equity incentives is significantly greater in countries with stronger insider trading restrictions, and these higher incentives are associated with higher total pay. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of insider trading restrictions and enforcement, and to panel regressions with country fixed effects. We also find significant increases in top executive pay and the use of equity-based incentives in the period immediately following the initial enforcement of insider trading laws. We conclude that insider trading laws are one channel through which cross-country differences in pay practices can be explained.

This paper considers the term structure of interest rates implied by a production-based asset pricing model in which the fundamental drivers are investment in equipment and structures as well as inflation. The model matches the average yield curve up to five-year maturity almost perfectly. Longer term yields are roughly as volatile as in the data. The model also generates time-varying bond risk premiums. In particular, when running Fama-Bliss regressions of excess returns on forward premiums, the model produces slope coefficients of roughly half the size of the empirical counterparts. Closed-form expressions highlight the importance of the capital depreciation rates for interest rate dynamics.

In this study we examine the impact of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) decision to accelerate the filing of 10-Ks. The SEC argued that the accelerated deadline would increase the relevance of the disclosures, making the reports more useful. Opponents countered that the accelerated deadline would decrease the representational faithfulness of the disclosures, especially for smaller firms. We document a significant decrease in the 10-K market reaction for smaller firms as they accelerate from 90 to 75 days. For larger firms we find no significant change in the market reaction from 90 to 75 days. However, as these larger firms accelerate their 10-K deadline to 60 days, we find a significant increase in the market reaction. We also examine changes in reporting quality, shifts in information content, and changes in 10-K filing order and clustering and find results that are consistent with accelerated filing having significant impacts on representational faithfulness and relevance.