We examine changes in the pricing and financial structure of large management buyouts in the 1980s. Over time, (1) buyout price to cash flow ratios rose in absolute terms (particularly in deals financed using public junk bonds); (2) required bank principal repayments accelerated, leading to sharply lower ratios of cash flow to total debt obligations; (3) private subordinated and bank debt were replaced by public junk debt; and (4) management teams and dealmakers took more money out of transactions up front. These patterns are consistent with an “overheating” phenomenon in the buyout market. Preliminary post-buyout evidence lends some support to this interpretation.

This paper develops a model that speaks to the goals and methods of financial-stability policies. There are three main points. First, from a normative perspective, the model defines the fundamental market failure to be addressed, namely that unregulated private money creation can lead to an externality in which intermediaries issue too much short-term debt and leave the system excessively vulnerable to costly financial crises. Second, it shows how in a simple economy where commercial banks are the only lenders, conventional monetary-policy tools such as open-market operations can be used to regulate this externality, while in more advanced economies it may be helpful to supplement monetary policy with other measures. Third, from a positive perspective, the model provides an account of how monetary policy can influence bank lending and real activity, even in a world where prices adjust frictionlessly and there are other transactions media besides bank-created money that are outside the control of the central bank.

The majority of asset-management intermediaries (e.g., mutual funds, hedge funds) are structured on an open-end basis, even though it appears that the open-end form can be a serious impediment to arbitrage. I argue that when funds compete to attract investors' dollars, the equilibrium degree of open-ending in an economy can be excessive from the point of view of these investors. One implication of the analysis is that, even absent short-sales constraints or other frictions, economically large mispricings can coexist with rational, competitive arbitrageurs who earn small excess returns.

This paper presents a framework for analyzing the costs and benefits of internal versus external capital allocation. We focus primarily on comparing an internal capital market with bank lending. While both represent centralized forms of financing, in the former case the financing is owner-provided, while in the latter case it is not. We argue that the ownership aspect of internal capital allocation has three important consequences: (1) it leads to more monitoring than bank lending; (2) it reduces managers' entrepreneurial incentives; and (3) it makes it easier to efficiently redeploy the assets of projects that are performing poorly under existing management.

We use a simple model to outline the conditions under which corporate investment is sensitive to nonfundamental movements in stock prices. The key prediction is that stock prices have a stronger impact on the investment of “equity-dependent” firms—firms that need external equity to finance marginal investments. Using an index of equity dependence based on the work of Kaplan and Zingales, we find support for this hypothesis. In particular, firms that rank in the top quintile of the KZ index have investment that is almost three times as sensitive to stock prices as firms in the bottom quintile.

This paper examines micro data on U. S. manufacturing firms' inventory behavior during different macroeconomic episodes. Much of the analysis focuses on the 1981–1982 recession, which was apparently caused in large part by tight monetary policy. We find that the inventory investment of firms without access to public bond markets is significantly liquidity-constrained during this period. A similar pattern emerges during the 1974–1975 recession, in which tight money also appears to have played a role. In contrast, such liquidity constraints are largely absent during periods of looser monetary policy in the 1970s and 1980s.