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The Creation and Capture of Rents: Wages and Innovation in a Panel of U. K. Companies

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1996 111(1), 195-226
This paper examines the impact of technological innovation on wages using a panel of British firms. A head-count measure of major innovations between 1945 and 1983 is combined with share price and accounting information. Innovating firms are found to have higher average wages, but rival innovation tends to depress own wages. This appears consistent with a model where wages are partly determined by a sharing in the rents generated by innovation. In other words, innovation may be a good instrument for proxies for rents such as profitability, quasi rents, or Tobin's (average) Q . Instrumental variable estimates of the elasticity between wages and quasi rents are about 0.29.

Skill-Biased Organizational Change? Evidence from A Panel of British and French Establishments

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2001 116(4), 1449-1492
This paper investigates the determination and consequences of organizational changes (OC) in a panel of British and French establishments. Organizational changes include the decentralization of authority, delayering of managerial functions, and increased multitasking. We argue that OC and skills are complements. We offer support for the hypothesis of “skill-biased” organizational change with three empirical findings. First, organizational changes reduce the demand for unskilled workers in both countries. Second, OC is negatively associated with increases in regional skill price differentials (a measure of the relative supply of skill). Third, OC leads to greater productivity increases in establishments with larger initial skill endowments. Technical change is also complementary with human capital, but the effects of OC is not simply due to its correlation with technological change but has an independent role.

Measuring and Explaining Management Practices Across Firms and Countries

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2007 122(4), 1351-1408
We use an innovative survey tool to collect management practice data from 732 medium-sized firms in the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. These measures of managerial practice are strongly associated with firm-level productivity, profitability, Tobin's Q, and survival rates. Management practices also display significant cross-country differences, with U.S. firms on average better managed than European firms, and significant within-country differences, with a long tail of extremely badly managed firms. We find that poor management practices are more prevalent when product market competition is weak and/or when family-owned firms pass management control down to the eldest sons (primogeniture).

The Impact of Competition on Management Quality: Evidence from Public Hospitals

Review of Economic Studies 2015 82(2), 457-489
We analyse the causal impact of competition on managerial quality and hospital performance. To address the endogeneity of market structure we analyse the English public hospital sector where entry and exit are controlled by the central government. Because closing hospitals in areas where the governing party is expecting a tight election race (“marginals”) is rare due to the fear of electoral defeat, we can use political marginality as an instrumental variable for the number of hospitals in a geographical area. We find that higher competition results in higher management quality, measured using a new survey tool, and improved hospital performance. Adding a rival hospital increases management quality by 0.4 standard deviations and increases survival rates from emergency heart attacks by 9.7%. We confirm the robustness of our IV strategy to “hidden policies” that could be used in marginal districts to improve hospital management and to changes in capacity that may follow from hospital closure.