Journal Article Distortions and Immiserizing Growth: a Generalization Get access Jagdish N. Bhagwati Jagdish N. Bhagwati Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Delhi School of Economics Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 35, Issue 4, October 1968, Pages 481–485, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296774 Published: 01 October 1968

Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Bent Hansen; A Theoretical Analysis of Smuggling: A Reply*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 89, Issue 4, 1 November 1975, P

The theory of preferential trade agreements (PTA's), or what might be described in policy terms as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXIV sanctioned free-trade areas (FTA's) and Customs Unions (CU's), has undergone two phases of evolution, in two very different modes, largely reflecting the contrasting policy concerns of the time. In this paper, we trace this evolution, offering both a historical context and an intellectual coherence to diverse analytical approaches.

Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Balbir S. Sihag; Dual Markets, Rationing, and Queues*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 95, Issue 4, 1 December 1980, Pages 775–7

Jagdish N. Bhagwati, T. N. Srinivasan; Domestic Resource Costs, Effective Rates of Protection, and Project Analysis in Tariff-Distorted Economies*, The Quarterl

The theory of commercial policy has recently addressed three phenomena: (i) tariff (quota) seeking or lobbying by potential beneficiaries for the imposition of a tariff (quota), (ii) tariff (quota) evasion, and (iii) rent seeking or lobbying for getting an allocation of the import quota to earn the rents generated. Revenue seeking or lobbying to secure a share in the disposition of the tariff revenues is analyzed here. it is shown that revenue seeking may, even for a small country, result in a reduction in importable output. Furthermore, revenue seeking may be welfare improving. Rent seeking may be welfare improving as well.

This paper reconsiders the welfare effects of a transfer payment in a two-commodity world with two agents (countries), by taking the presence of exogenous and endogenous distortions into account. When there is an exogenous tax-cumsubsidy on production, consumption, or trade, the analysis demonstrates that a transfer may paradoxically enrich the donor and immiserize the recipient under certain specific conditions. These welfare paradoxes are also shown to be possible if the transfer endogenously induces “directly unproductive profit-seeking” activity of lobbyists. Concluding remarks emphasize the paper's relevance for policymakers.